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Abstract. At the core of U.S. trade law is an under-studied structural dichotomy. On the
one hand, well-established statutory authorities enable the President to eliminate trade
barriers through negotiations with U.S. trading partners. On the other hand, different,
lesser-known authorities allow the President o erect trade barriers on an exceptional basis
where necessary for U.S. economic security. Rather than thinking of free trade as a source
of or tool for economic security as political theorists long have, our law codifies these
authorities as though they are in contrast to one another-allowing departures from the
free trade norm when security so demands. Further, the two categories of authorities
suffer from a mismatch in what I call "trade delegation disciplines": While Congress kept
tight controls on the President's free trade negotiations, it abandoned controls on the
exceptional, security-driven authorities, empowering the executive to handle U.S. trade
interests in an unbridled way that our nation's Founders feared.
This Article is the first to identify how trade law has exceptionalized security. It develops
an original typology of the categories of congressional delegations that constitute our
exceptional trade apparatus. This structural account delivers both positive and normative
payoffs. Apart from explaining the institutional terrain, identifying the dichotomy
challenges the traditional assumption that all executive departures from the prevailing
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free trade norm are illegal and illegitimate. The historical record demonstrates that,
surprisingly, security exceptionalism in U.S. trade law is the product of misunderstood
statutes that have been unmoored from their original purposes. Finally, although the
exceptions may be difficult to undo or to correct, this analysis shows that trade law has
space for a wide array of innovative and nontraditional disciplines that could serve to
limit the damage that exceptionalizing security has caused. A review of those options
likewise provides certain lessons for the limitations of the nondelegation doctrine and
separation of powers.
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Introduction
The conventional view on trade law in the United States is that it
comprises a set of delegations from Congress to the President that facilitate
international cooperation in favor of economic liberalization.1 This Article
argues that this account is incomplete. In fact, our trade law is riddled with
underused and under-studied exceptions. Whereas the literature has focused
on shared powers to negotiate and implement free trade agreements, this
research shows that U.S. trade law is a substantially mixed bag of delegations.
That bag contains not just authorities to break down barriers to trade but also,
surprisingly, authorities to put up barriers in certain circumstances. The latter
delegations are now being rediscovered, and they all have one thing in
common-they all purport to empower the President o put up those barriers
in the interest of U.S. economic security.2
This Article provides the first comprehensive study of what I term "trade's
security exceptionalism"-and with some urgency.3 As recent events have
1. See, e.g., CATHLEEN D. CIMINO-ISAACS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R45148, U.S. TRADE
POLICY PRIMER: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 27 (2019) (describing how U.S. trade
policy is premised on the delegation of certain powers to the President to negotiate
trade agreements). In fact, most international trade law textbooks today focus precisely
on what their titles suggest: the international framework where the rules of economic
liberalization are enacted and played out. Few spend considerable time on U.S. trade
statutes, except as they are relevant to international agreements. See, e.g., JOOST H.B.
PAUWELYN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, at xi-xxi (3d ed. 2016) (noting in the
table of contents the United States as one of a handful of case studies).
2. I discuss my choice and use of the term "economic security" below at text
accompanying notes 70-72.
3. Scholars from other areas of law, particularly foreign relations law, have developed
ideas about exceptionalism from which this Article draws inspiration, but I use the
term differently. As elaborated below at text accompanying note 22, I am not claiming
as a central point that trade is exceptional within foreign affairs or that its reliance on
exceptions makes it exceptional. Rather, this Article seeks to elaborate on the
unexpected function that trade's overlooked exceptions have played in shaping trade
policy. This clarification is important given the diverse usages of "exceptions" and
"exceptionalism" in the foreign affairs literature. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our
Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 539 n.51
(1999) (defining foreign affairs exceptionalism as "the view that the usual
constitutional restraints on the federal government's exercise of power do not apply in
the area of foreign affairs"); Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009
SUP. CT. REV. 225, 226 (arguing against a distinct exceptionalism doctrine in the
national security context of emergency detention policies); Harold Hongju Koh,
Foreword, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1480 (2003) (asserting that
"American Exceptionalism" is a "leitmotif' in contemporary media); David S.
Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 Nw. U. L. REV.
583, 584-85 (2017) (noting that immigration law has exceptions-areas where the
Supreme Court has developed "special immigration doctrines that depart from
mainstream constitutional norms"-and that these exceptions make immigration law
distinct from other areas of law); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The
footnote continued on next page
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brought these exceptions to the fore, commentators have claimed that trade
law, its institutions, and the "trade rule of law" are under threat.4 While those
assessments underscore the important potential consequences of those policy
choices, I argue in this Article that our trade law is structurally predisposed to
entertain these excursions. But it was not always this way.
Trade law in the United States finds its foundation in the Constitution,
which grants Congress the power to collect duties and to regulate foreign
commerce.5 For many years, Congress did just that. Beginning in the late
nineteenth century, however, Congress began to delegate considerable trade
power to the President.6 Eventually, Congress granted the President authority
to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with U.S. trading partners in which
both sides agree to remove or reduce trade barriers, for example, by lowering
tariff rates.7 Those statutes and those agreements, perceived by many to make
Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1900 (2015) (using
"exceptionalism" as a "belief that legal issues arising from [an area of law] are
functionally, doctrinally, and even methodologically distinct from those arising in
[another area]").
4. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster & Sergio Puig, Symposium Introduction, Can International
Trade Law Recover?, 113 AM. J. INT'L L.: UNBOUND 38, 38 (2019) (arguing that there is a
"substantive and procedural onslaught on international trade law"); Thomas J.
Schoenbaum & Daniel C.K. Chow, The Perils of Economic Nationalism and a Proposed
Pathway to Trade Harmony, 30 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 115, 117 & n.8 (2019) (showing that
some industry members also share the view that the United States is pursuing a power-
based trade policy by quoting Ambassador Rufus Yerxa, former Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) and Deputy Director General of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), as saying, "[tihe Trump administration pretty much signaled it is
throwing out the rule book on trade" (quoting David J. Lynch et al., Trump Imposes Steel
and Aluminum Tariffs on the E.U., Canada and Mexico, WASH. POST (May 31, 2018, 1:32 PM
CDT), https://perma.cc/27JF-7FHT)); Gregory Shaffer, A Tragedy in the Making? The
Decline of Law and the Return of Power in International Trade Relations, 44 YALE J. INT'L L.
ONLINE 37, 41-42 (2018) (asserting that the Trump Administration's trade policies
represent a return to power-based trade policy and a turn away from multilateral
rules); Manfred Elsig et al., Trump Is Fighting an Open War on Trade. His Stealth War
on Trade May Be Even More Important., WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2017, 4:00 AM PDT),
https://perma.cc/TK3E-W7M6 (claiming that the Trump Administration's trade
policies are harming the WTO); Matthew Kahn, Pretextual Protectionism? The Perils of
Invoking the WTO National Security Exception, LAWFARE (July 21, 2017, 2:51 PM),
https://perma.cc/H2TM-G3JW (referring to the Trump Administration's expected
invocation of a national security exception at the WTO as the "nuclear option" or
"third rail" of international trade); Zachary Karabell, Trump's Creative Destruction of the
International Order, FOREIGN POL'Y (June 11, 2018, 9:37 PM), https://perma.cc/QT6Y-
36UN (considering the change to the prior neoliberal order); Anthea Roberts et al., The
Geoeconomic World Order, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2018, 11:17 AM), https://perma.cc/K76B-
YWSH (arguing that we are "entering into a new geoeconomic world order").
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3.
6. See infra Part I.
7. See Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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up the foundation of our trade law today,8 have been the subject of
considerable attention among scholars and Congress for the last several
decades. When examined closely, however, it becomes clear that Congress has
delegated two distinct sets of tariff-related authorities to the President. In
addition to those well-studied delegations that enable the President o eliminate
tariffs through negotiations that lead to reciprocal free trade agreements with
other countries, a second set enables the executive to impose tariffs when
economic security so requires.9 In contrast with the familiar first group, the
second is underanalyzed and its potential is not fully known. Together, the
two sets codify distinct approaches to trade-a primary, tariff-lowering
approach and a secondary, security-premised, tariff-raising approach. Recent
invocations of the latter are likely just the tip of the iceberg.
By unearthing these sets of delegations, this Article provides a framework,
through some reverse engineering, for understanding U.S. trade law and
policy. It offers a thorough descriptive review of the United States's
exceptional statutory trade law apparatus and shows that the economic
security exceptions have grown in scope and power. Two types of these
exceptional delegations surface: one group with express security rationales, or
"hard security exceptions," and another with functional security rationales, or
"soft security exceptions." Both types rely on a general concept of U.S.
economic security-notions of which have evolved over time.
The dichotomous framework comprising free trade and economic security
powers is not just a scholarly metaphor for thinking about past congressional-
executive action: Seeing trade law as structured according to two contrasting
sets of delegations helps us deconstruct the present so-called trade war and
contextualize it in a much longer separation-of-trade-law-powers tradition.
Importantly, this structural appraisal of trade law illuminates another layer to
trade's security exceptionalism: a divergence in the way Congress oversees one
set of delegations as compared to the other. With respect to the primary
liberalizing delegations to make robust free trade agreements, Congress
progressively added more procedural constraints. In contrast, Congress did
little to nothing to control presidential action with respect to the exceptions.
The exceptions were left unchecked as they were not a part of what was
considered the main trade law program. Both sets of delegations carve out a
space for executive action, but one does so in a carefully circumscribed way
while the other does not. This mismatch in what I call "trade delegation
8. Trade agreements and international trade institutions have been the main subject of
trade scholarship, teaching, and policy for the last twenty years. To be sure, the object
of this study is not an exhaustive review of all trade law. My emphasis is on foreign-
facing U.S. laws, particularly congressional delegations to the President to manage the
United States's relationships with its trading partners.
9. See infra Part I.B.
1102
Trade's Security Exceptionalism
72 STAN. L. REV. 1097 (2020)
disciplines" allows the President to act without any supervision when he
wishes to set higher tariffs on certain goods or on goods coming from certain
countries. Thus, the two-track statutes laid the foundation for the current
terrain in which the Trump Administration's application of the exceptions is
the centerpiece of its trade policy, pushing the bounds of the executive's foreign
commerce authority.10
A further aim of this Article is to develop a positive theory of trade's
security exceptionalism to examine why and how this dichotomy emerged,
particularly given that the prevailing view in other fields such as political
science is that trade and security are complementary.11 As the history
recounted here reveals, no single motivation drove the implementation or
longevity of these exceptions, and in some instances their permanence appears
incidental.
Path dependence in our exceptionalist approach obscures the question as to
how the law should manage matters of economic security. From a policy
perspective, trade's ecurity exceptionalism is a double-edged sword. Special
security delegations to the executive or dispensations may be used for
necessary emergency measures, but they can also be abused. For a field that
relies on stability and predictability to avoid global financial crisis, trade law's
exceptional framework creates real and considerable risk at the same time that
it creates flexibility. This difficulty raises the question whether it is possible to
develop trade law in such a way that manages any overreach that may occur
when the motivating values underlying free trade principles and economic
security goals fail.
Expanding definitions of "security," and particularly economic security,
complicate the issue, marrying domestic and international concerns in unique
10. See, e.g., Chad P. Bown & Soumaya Keynes, Trade Talks, US Trade Policy Before Trump,
with Ambassador Michael Froman at 12:26-13:53, TRADE TALKS (July 19, 2019),
https://perma.cc/MV4M-3UK3 (noting "an evolution in the relationship between
economics and national security ... in the current administration, where now China, as
a national security threat, seems to be the dominant perspective ... they've re-linked
the trade issues, but in somewhat he opposite direction, saying, if you work with us on
a national security issue, you may get a better deal on the trade side"); Anshu
Siripurapu, Analysts Weigh Legality of U.S.-China Trade Deal, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Mar. 15,
2019, 1:57 PM), https://perma.cc/4C9A-4RXR; Todd Tucker, Are National Security Tariffs
Legal?, MEDIUM (Feb. 16,2018), https://perma.cc/7YPP-RCA3.
11. Note that the type of complementarity may differ just as definitions of "trade" and of
"security" may differ. In other words, there is a broad theme in the literature that the
two ideas interact in positive ways, not in opposition. See, e.g., Kal J. Holsti, Politics in
Command: Foreign Trade as National Security Policy, 40 INT'L ORG. 643, 644
(1986) (referring to the work of Robert Gilpin and Robert Keohane to support this
claim); Brian M. Pollins, Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effect of International
Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows, 33 AM. J. POL. Scl. 737, 758 (1989); Andrew
Holland, How Trade Agreements Build Peace, AM. SECURITY PROJECT (July 28, 2017),
https://perma.cc/DK2F-PXNN.
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ways as trade does.12 It takes but a few examples to illustrate the problem: Is it
possible to construct a policy for engaging with China, perceived by some as a
threat to U.S. security, that strikes the right balance for U.S. farmers, ranchers,
other workers, and entire industries while still maintaining a viable system of
international rules? Is there an approach that can appropriately support U.S.
businesses in the face of globalization while still promoting cross-border
activity with trading partners like Mexico? Questions like these are central to
contemporary trade policy.
While the target of this Article is U.S. law regulating imports and exports,
the province and influence of trade exceptionalism are not so limited. Twenty-
first century trade law is a patchwork of domestic and international rules. It
encompasses institutions at both levels that complement and reinforce each
other.13 Trade institutions are intended to constrain incentives by states
(internationally) and the executive (domestically) to break the rules for short-
term political or economic gains. But in both systems, they also provide for
exceptional behavior where security demands. In other words, there is a
parallel story to be told of international exceptions. The multilateral trade
system accommodates security as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness or
as an excuse from liability. 14 It legalizes certain exemptions from the rules,
allowing a government to claim security in its defense. Exceptions at the
domestic level are framed differently, but they nevertheless also permit action
contrary to the principal norm. In contrast to the excuse-from-liability
approach in international law, U.S. law grants the President access to additional
powers where an emergency, a threat to the U.S. economy, or national security
so justifies.15 What is important for my purposes is that while they frame the
12. See J. Benton Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order, 129 YALE
L.J. 1020, 1022-32 (2020) (discussing the expanding definition of "national security" and
its impact on international economic law); Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade
and the Separation of Powers, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 583, 586-97 (2019) (discussing the
competing domestic and international paradigms in trade law).
13. For example, the United States has regularly entered into agreements with trading
partners or at the WTO that are then implemented into U.S. law. See, e.g., United
States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41, 125 Stat.
428 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 and 26 U.S.C.) (codifying into
U.S. statutes the commitments negotiated by the U.S. executive branch with South
Korea).
14. See Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, International Adjudication on National Security Issues:
What Role for the W/TO?, 43 VA.J. INT'L L. 365, 366-69 (describing how national security
can be used in different ways across areas of international law, but especially so in
trade); see also Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, "Constitutionalization" and
Dispute Settlement in the W/TO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM.J. INT'L
L. 424, 426 (1999) ("Wherever international law is created, the issue of national security
gives rise to some sort of loophole .... The right of any nation-state to protect itself...
has been a bedrock feature of the international legal system.").
15. See infra Part I.B.
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issue differently, both domestic and international law tend to see traditional
ideas of free trade as being in opposition to ideas of security.16
I argue that there is another way, even if it is handicapped by U.S. judicial
doctrines, and that more ought to be done to reconcile concepts of free trade
and economic security in the law. The present structure exceptionalizes
economic security to its detriment. This is not to suggest that the concept of an
exception or the availability of emergency action is not warranted; rather, I
maintain that, in the case of trade, their justifications are inconsistent with
other frames-frames that have long guided the U.S. trade/security relationship
in practice-and that the record shows that was not the intention of the
drafters of these exceptions.17 I set out alternative normative visions, rooted in
U.S. history, that counsel a mutually reinforcing relationship between trade
and security. These visions were not lost but simply overshadowed by the
trajectory of trade patterns and constitutional law doctrines. As this Article
reveals, today's codified exceptionalism is itself exceptional. Recognizing the
historical forces informing the present moment opens up new lines of inquiry
into appropriate configurations of power across the branches.
As is clear from the themes that it brings together, this Article is situated at
the intersection of three different areas of scholarship: trade law,
administrative and constitutional law concerning the separation of powers,
and national security law. While any two of these areas have found overlap in
important past work,18 no study has sought to reconcile all three. Commentary
on these areas has remained siloed, just as the law has. This Article tries to
begin a conversation among them, legally and academically.
16. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [hereinafter GATT] art. XXI, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, A63, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 266; infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. See, e.g., Kathleen Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, 43 YALE J. INT'L L. 315, 316-
20 (2018) (discussing trade and the separation of powers); Ryan Goodman, Norms and
National Security: The WTO as a Catalyst for Inquiry, 2 CHI.J. INT'L L. 101, 101-02 (2001)
(discussing trade and national security); Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the
National Security State, 104 IowA L. REV. 139, 142-43 (2018) (discussing the intersection
of the separation of powers and national security); Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional
Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1191, 1191 (1986) (discussing separation of powers and trade); Harold Hongju Koh
& John Choon Yoo, Perspective, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The Fabric of Economics
and National Security Law, 26 INT'L LAW. 715, 715-16 (1992) (discussing trade and
national security); John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and the Separation of
Powers Under the United States Constitution, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 203, 203-04 (1995)
(discussing the separation of powers and trade); Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 12, at
651 (commenting that "trade conflicts rarely involve ... immediate risks to national
security"); Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1417, 1422 (2012)
(discussing national security and the separation of powers).
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To be sure, that there are security exceptions throughout trade law should
not be surprising, especially to national security scholars. National security
scholars both in political theory and in law have long recognized the structure
of presidential authority as shaped by exceptions.19 Those scholars likewise see
recent trade moves as part of the Trump Administration's larger project of
making claims concerning "national security" to justify expansive executive
authority in collision with longstanding foreign policy goals or the administration
of the regulatory state.20 Security-specific exceptions are prevalent in our law,
permitting the President to move government resources without congressional
approval or to take immigration action, among other authorizations, based on
security needs.2 1 Economic security remains an underexplored area, however.
Thus, this analysis underscores where the law and discussions about the law
may fail to accommodate global and institutional needs when it comes to trade
and security. Rethinking what makes the best confluence of powers in this
respect may be trade law's next essential undertaking.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the two groups of trade
law delegations. It charts these features for the first time, looking beyond just
the traditionally discussed aspects of the hallmark trade acts and noting that
they differ along three dimensions: (1) purpose or justification (free trade or
economic security); (2) their prescription for tariffs (more or fewer); and (3) the
procedures that apply to them (strict or loose). The Part introduces a taxonomy
of trade's delegation disciplines and shows how, as a result, our trade law
structure is predisposed toward presidential trade actions in favor of exceptional
policy choices and against a free trade norm. Part II considers the positive and
19. See, e.g., Rana, supra note 18, at 1422 (discussing the drift toward greater executive
power in security arrangements in law); id. (referring to the normalization of
emergency (citing Kim Lane Scheppele, Exceptions That Prove the Rule: Embedding
Emergency Government in Everyday Constitutional Life, in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 124, 124-34 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Stephen Macedo eds., 2010))).
20. The move toward broader claims of national security can be seen in areas as diverse as
immigration, foreign investment, and individual rights. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (commenting that the Trump
Administration's Muslim-ban policy "masquerades behind a facade of national-security
concerns"); Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 20, 2019) (declaring a
national emergency concerning immigration and smuggling at the southern border of
the United States); Dave Philipps, Judge Blocks Trump's Ban on Transgender Troops in
Military, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/JDN3-3L49 (reporting on the
Trump Administration's claim of national security to justify expelling transgender
individuals from the U.S. military); Adam Rhodes, CFIUS Casts Wider Net, with Eye on
Consumer Data Access, LAW360 (Apr. 10, 2018, 5:26 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/GU4C-
2S7W (examining how "the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has
been broadening its view of what constitutes a national security concern severe
enough to block a deal").
21. See Harlan Grant Cohen, The National Security Delegation Conundrum, JUST SECURITY
(July 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/S4NA-LMD3.
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normative payoffs of this structural model. In so doing, it explains why trade
law developed in this dichotomous way and demonstrates that, unexpectedly,
these exceptions are partly a product of experimentation and incidental trade
lawmaking in the United States. Last, Part III argues that this research corrects
certain misconceptions among commentators about current trade law
practices. The Trump Administration's invocation of the exceptional
delegations is an outlier among past uses, but not as much of an outlier as
critics think. Still, because the dangers of exceptionalism outweigh its rewards,
I agree with critics that revision is needed. As de-exceptionalizing is likely not
possible, lawmakers ought to consider innovative delegation disciplines to
better manage the policymaking space on trade and security. The Article
concludes with takeaways for broader debates surrounding the nondelegation
doctrine and the separation of powers.
A final note about terminology: Although trade is unique in many respects
when compared with other areas of cross-border regulation, that is not the
focus of my exceptionalism critique.22 As noted above, capacious national
security exceptions are common in statutes governing other bodies of law. The
claim here is narrower: I develop a structural analysis of U.S. trade law as a way
to understand the legal forces shaping the present moment. While lawmakers
have developed a primary free trade norm, they have likewise developed and
neglected a set of exceptions. Nearly all of those exceptions can be and have
been viewed as authorizing the President to raise tariffs where security or
emergency dictates. The Trump Administration has relied heavily on these
seemingly forgotten domestic authorities that specifically call into question the
separation of trade law powers in the interests of global authority. My research
uncovers these domestic authorities hiding in plain sight, and I argue that, as
currently structured, they contribute to instability in U.S. trade law and policy;
but it does not have to be that way.
22. Cf Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 12, at 587-90 (arguing that trade is dissimilar in
important respects to other foreign affairs and national security policy areas). While I
agree with Meyer and Sitaraman that trade ought not to be seen as exceptional "simply
because it touches on foreign affairs," id. at 588, trade is arguably exceptional and
unique in at least three ways: First, it is constitutionally specially situated as compared
to other areas of foreign affairs in the relevance of Articles I and II to its direction;
second, it relies upon binding, enforceable international agreements, which could be
said to occupy the field and, in policymaking, likewise looks both inward and outward
more than do other areas; and third, as illustrated in this Article, it is characterized in
the last fifty years by remarkable consistency in a now-bipartisan, normative commitment
to a guiding ideology and governance concept. I am exploring some of these issues in a
forthcoming study on executive trade agreements. Kathleen Claussen, Trade Executive
Agreements (May 26,2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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I. Our Trade Law Architecture
Understanding the workings of U.S. trade law requires a sense of what this
body of law comprises. Colloquially, "trade" involves a wide range of
international transactions as well as certain domestic regulations with cross-
border impact. Legally, a complex institutional design governs what we think
of as trade.23 Today's trade law is more expansive than ever before.24 It not
only encompasses tools that include traditional border measures, like tariffs,
but it also involves regulatory measures that in prior decades would not be
considered to fall under the trade umbrella at all. It covers private rights of
action as much as it governs state action.25
So where does one locate the rules that comprise U.S. trade law? Even if we
could articulate a comprehensive concept of "trade," we might still struggle to
find all the applicable U.S. laws that manage it. As a single body, it is as difficult
to locate as it is to define. There is no particular handbook or signaling
mechanism to help identify where to find "trade" statutes or regulations.26 One
might expect to dig into Title 19 of the U.S. Code, named Customs Duties, or
Title 15, called Commerce and Trade, but those would be insufficient-and in
the case of the latter, inaccurate27-excavation sites. Similarly, although there is
a U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) that receives roughly two to four
hundred new cases each year,28 those important cases are only a small part of
the trade law landscape. We could look to trade law scholarship for a guide, but
much greater emphasis is placed on international institutions than on domestic
ones, making U.S. trade law-to the extent it differs from international law-
23. That complex design includes both transnational and domestic elements, as introduced
briefly at note 13 above.
24. See, e.g., Claussen, supra note 18, at 316 (discussing the growth of "bilateral and regional
trade agreements"); Simon Lester, The Role of the International Trade Regime in Global
Governance, 16 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 209, 211, 221-42 (2011) (providing an
overview of the expansion of trade agreements).
25. See Lester, supra note 24, at 211, 221-42.
26. Some private outfits have sought to compile collections for practitioners. See, e.g., U.S.
Trade Laws, WASH. TRADE REP., https://perma.cc/YK8V-QM9E (archived Oct. 20,
2019).
27. Title 15 concerns mostly interstate rather than foreign commerce.
28. U.S. Courts, Table G-1: U.S. Court of International Trade-Cases Filed, Terminated,
and Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2015 and 2016 (n.d.),
https://perma.cc/87MR-P5GH (showing 390 cases filed from 2014 to 2015, and 270
from 2015 to 2016); U.S. Courts, Table G-1: U.S. Court of International Trade-Cases
Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30,
2017 and 2018 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/33CV-H6JS (showing 313 cases filed from 2016 to
2017, and 242 from 2017 to 2018); U.S. Courts, Table G-1. U.S. Court of International
Trade-Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending
September 30, 2018 and 2019 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/C8QP-PTHA (showing 223 cases
filed from 2018 to 2019).
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seem elusive.29 The slippery territory between domestic and international
trade law further underscores one of the primary points of this Article: Until
recently, narrow delegations of authority to the President to adjust individual
U.S. tariff rates on particular products had declined in importance as
international trade law and megaregional free trade agreements were seen to
occupy and govern the public trade space.30
Also lost from most accounts of U.S. trade law is the fact that over many
years of passing omnibus trade acts, Congress sometimes empowered the
President to lower tariffs and sometimes empowered him to raise tariffs,
particularly in light of security concerns. This Part identifies those contrasting
authorities and analyzes how free trade and ideas of economic security have
become dichotomous in U.S. law. The exceptional delegations differ from the
free trade delegations not just in their justification and in their direction but
also in many respects in the stringency of the oversight that applies to their
exercise. The Part begins by looking at the congressional delegations to the
President regarding free trade: those that enable the President to engage in
trade liberalization. These delegations make up the dominant and well-studied
norm in trade law in favor of lowering tariff and other barriers. Then this Part
turns to the second category: the exceptions, or, as I will illustrate, how trade
became "securitized."
A. The Codification of Free Trade
Over the course of the twentieth century, many of the world's major
powers worked their way to free trade as a guiding principle for rulemaking.
They institutionalized those rules at the international level.31 It was not an
easy path, nor is the exercise of lowering barriers to trade complete. Getting to
"yes" on free trade required a massive change in thinking among policymakers
29. Since the 1970s, trade has been seen as an "intermestic" policy area, requiring both
domestically and internationally oriented lawmaking. See Bayless Manning, The
Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 306, 309
(1977).
30. Exacerbating this perception is the fact that few law schools offer any courses on U.S.
trade law. I cover both U.S. and international trade law in one course. Many colleagues
have reported to me that they address U.S. trade law only incidentally in an
international trade law course, if at all. Practice in domestic trade remedies has
continued to flourish, but few scholars have focused on that side of the law. For
example, a Westlaw search yields fewer than fifteen law review articles that address
trade remedies in any detail in the last three years. A search on November 15, 2019 for
ATLEAST5 "trade remedies" in "Law Reviews & Journals" for the last three years
generated thirteen results, several of which are not full-length law review articles.
31. See WILLIAM DEESE ET AL., U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. 4094, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS: SIXTH UPDATE 2009, at 60-61, 70-75 (2009),
https://perma.cc/E53F-W739.
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internationally32 and domestically, particularly within Congress.33 Still,
although Congress and the executive, like analogous institutions in other
countries, have debated the appropriate levels of liberalization, its pace, the
development of safeguards for the losers in the system, and how to manage
collateral damage from these economic principles, generally, trade
liberalization has proceeded expeditiously in recent decades.34 In recent years,
the partisan debates over liberalization have taken place not over the relative
value of it as compared to protectionism, but rather with regard to the
minutiae of implementation and substance at the margins, or in relation to
trade-plus issues35 such as the harmonization of regulations.36 Free trade has
far outdone protectionism in strength of principles on the global scale.
On the law side, the effort to codify and regulate a system of importation
and exportation facilitating free trade necessitated an institutional
reconfiguration. The challenge for U.S. law was that developing reciprocal
arrangements for free trade in principle and in practice required negotiation
with other countries-a move that meant codifying a process for giving greater
trade power to the President.
In the earliest days of U.S. trade lawmaking, Congress regularly issued
tariff schedules pursuant to its Article I authority.37 Tariffs were the primary
32. See Gilbert R. Winham, The Evolution of the World Trading System-The Economic and
Policy Context, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 5, 11-23
(Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009).
33. See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF U.S. TRADE POLICY
413, 454 (2017); DAVID A. LAKE, POWER, PROTECTION, AND FREE TRADE: INTERNATIONAL
SOURCES OF U.S. COMMERCIAL STRATEGY, 1887-1939, at 6-7 (1988) (describing the U.S.
transition to liberalism).
34. See LAKE, supra note 33, at 6-7; William J. Mateikis, The Fair Track to Expanded Free
Trade: Making TAA Benefits More Accessible to American Workers, 30 Hous.J. INT'L L. 1,7-
10(2007).
35. "Trade-plus" topics are commitments incorporated into trade agreements beyond
traditional tariff barriers. See Kathleen Claussen, Reimagining Trade-Plus Compliance:
The Labor Story, 23J. INT'L ECON. L. 25,26 (2020).
36. See, e.g., Isabelle Hoagland, Sen. Kaine Knocks Administration for Lack of Engagement on
USMCA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (May 3, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://perma.cc/6KH8-4SFB
(reporting on Senator Tim Kaine's complaint about the absence of executive
cooperation); William Alan Reinsch & Madeleine Waddoups, The Road to Ratification:
Democrats' Resistance to the USMCA, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. (May 16, 2019),
https://perma.cc/M7HV-6N5D (reviewing Democrats' concerns with the latest
proposed trade agreement: "labor enforcement, environmental regulation, and
pharmaceutical provisions").
37. For instance, the tariff acts from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are
summarized in U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, THE TARIFF AND ITS HISTORY: A COLLECTION OF
GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT 70-84 (1934).
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instrument of trade law and policy, and Congress regulated them fully with
few exceptions.3 8
National and international forces began to shift during the presidencies of
Chester A. Arthur and Grover Cleveland. Their advocacy for lower tariffs did
not succeed until after it cost Cleveland his reelection in 1888. 39 The Tariff Act
of 1890 was the first domestic legislation to grant the executive a license to
negotiate agreements with foreign countries to adjust tariffs by
proclamation.40 To be sure, the Act was highly protectionist, but it included
certain flexibilities for the President and enabled the duty-free entry of certain
raw materials as proposed by President Cleveland.4 1
38. See DEESE ET AL., supra note 31, at 65 ("Prior to the 1930 act, tariff changes were viewed
as entirely the domain of Congress." (footnote omitted)); Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard,
Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast Track: Building Common Ground on
Trade Demands More than a Name Change, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 6 (2003) ("Prior
to the twentieth century U.S. regulation of foreign commerce was almost exclusively a
congressional prerogative...."). Indeed, the U.S. Treasury derived about 90% of its revenue
from customs duties before the Civil War. John Mark Hansen, Taxation and the Political
Economy of the Tariff 44 INT'L ORG. 527, 529 (1990). There were some instances of
authorization for specific rate adjustments by the President or the Treasury and for the
negotiation of rate changes by executive agreement. See Kathleen Claussen, Trade
Administration, 107 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). These adjustments, however,
affected only minor parts of the tariff structure. The flexible tariff provision of the
Tariff Act of 1922 required the President o raise or lower tariffs to equalize the costs of
production of articles produced in the United States and in competing countries. See ch. 351,
§ 315(a), 42 Stat. 858, 941-42 (repealed 1930); Francis B. Sayre, The Constitutionality of the
TradeAgreementsAct, 39 COLuM.L.REV. 751, 763 (1939).
39. LAKE, supra note 33, at 98-99. President Benjamin Harrison nevertheless succeeded in
issuing some tariff adjustments, granting country-specific exemptions from custom
duties for certain goods, by proclamation. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 26, 27 Stat. 1025,
1025-26 (1892) (Guatemala); Proclamation No. 27, 27 Stat. 1026, 1026-27 (1892) (Austria-
Hungary).
40. Tariff Act of 1890 (McKinley Tariff), ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612; see also Oona A.
Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the
United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1292-94 (2008); F.W. Taussig, The New United States
Tariff 4 ECON.J. 573, 573-74 (1894).
41. See Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1292-93 (noting the incorporation of the Cleveland
proposal); Historical Highlights: The McKinley Tariff of 1890, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES:
HIST., ART & ARCHIVES (archived Apr. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/2SZU-93HE. A special
commissioner appointed by President McKinley negotiated eleven agreements with
foreign countries, but these did not receive congressional approval and never came
into effect. See William B. Kelly, Jr., Antecedents of Present Commercial Policy, 1922-1934, in
STUDIES IN UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL POLICY 3, 26 & n.75 (William B. Kelly, Jr. ed.,
1963). Shortly thereafter, McKinley changed his view in favor of free trade, and became
President, paving the way for the Tariff of 1897, which authorized the President to
enter into agreements to reduce certain import duties for limited periods, Tariff of
1897 (Dingley Act), ch. 11, § 4, 30 Stat. 151, 204-05. The 1897 law also authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury to impose an offsetting duty if he found a government was
subsidizing exports. Id. § 5, 30 Stat. at 205. The Revenue Act of 1913 similarly gave the
President the power to negotiate "trade agreements with foreign nations wherein
footnote continued on next page
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The critical juncture for executive empowerment and the promotion of
trade liberalization was the enactment of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
of 1934 (RTAA).42 The RTAA allowed the President to enter into trade
agreements and to proclaim lower duties on foreign goods entering the United
States without congressional review.43 For the next several years, Presidents
negotiated a number of agreements with trading partners under this authority.44
The RTAA represented a major step in securing a longstanding free trade
policy 45 in its empowerment of the President to enter into trade agreements
with foreign governments to reduce import restrictions. It also entrenched the
importance of international instruments in building policy and disseminating
this idea to U.S. trading partners. Reciprocal trade agreements that lowered
tariffs then became the primary instrument for U.S. trade policy.46
Following World War II, Congress continued to delegate its authority to
engage in negotiations with trading partners that aimed to lower tariffs and
tariff barriers to the President and executive agencies. It renewed the RTAA
authority multiple times.47 By the mid-1940s, that delegation had expanded to
include the authority to negotiate multilateral instruments, not just bilateral
agreements.48 Although there were some peaks and valleys in congressional
openness to enhancing the President's free trade authority, the executive-
driven agreements proliferated.49
The 1962 Trade Expansion Act reflected Congress's position that lowering
tariff barriers was such an important undertaking that it required the creation
of a new office-the Special Trade Representative for Trade Negotiations,
which would later become the ambassador-ranked, cabinet-level position of
mutual concessions are made looking toward freer trade relations and further
reciprocal expansion of trade and commerce," subject to congressional approval. Ch. 16,
§ 4, 38 Stat. 114, 192.
42. See Abraham Berglund, The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 25 AM. ECON. REV.
411,415-16 (1935).
43. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, § 1, 48 Stat. 943, 943-44 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C §§ 1351-1354 (2018)).
44. See ASHER ISAACS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: TARIFF AND COMMERCIAL POLICIES 257 (1948).
45. But see IRWIN, supra note 33, at 442 (noting that "[tihe trade agreements program is not
in any sense a free trade program," but rather "an attempt ... to restore... to American
enterprise its natural markets abroad and at the same time [provide] reasonable
protection for domestic industry" (alterations in original) (quoting Henry F. Grady, The
New Trade Policy of the United States, 14 FOREIGN AFF. 283, 295 (1936))).
46. See Hathaway, supra note 40, at 1293-98 (referring to this shift to reciprocal agreements
and describing it as a "sea change" in lawmaking authority).
47. Koh, supra note 18, at 1195 n.14.
48. See Ronald A. Brand, GATT and the Evolution of United States Trade Law, 18 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 101, 117-19 (1992).
49. See IRWIN, supra note 33, at 443-47.
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the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), housed in the Executive Office of the
President.50 A major concern among legislators at the time of the USTR's
creation was foreign discrimination against U.S. imports, and that the State
Department was ill equipped to carry forward a liberalization policy given its
other foreign policy interests.5 1
The 1974 omnibus trade act overhauled how Congress and the executive
branch could organize the U.S. government position regarding free trade
agreements. It brought the final implementation of agreements back to
Congress, as now agreements dealt not just with tariff barriers but also the
elimination of regulatory barriers to trade.52 Changes to the latter required
legislative implementation.53 In general terms, in what is now known as "fast
track" or Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation, Congress invites the
President to initiate negotiations with trading partners, and Congress also sets
the terms of engagement between itself and the executive branch for the
period of negotiations.54 The original 1974 act authorizes the President "to take
all appropriate and feasible steps within his power ... to harmonize, reduce, or
eliminate ... barriers to (and other distortions of) international trade."55
Other subsequent major trade acts would follow, including the
implementing legislation for multilateral negotiations that imposed additional
reductions in tariffs in 1979,56 legislation that renewed authority for trade
agreements and enabled a way forward for agreements with Canada and Israel
in 1984,57 and legislation that again renewed the authority to lay the
groundwork for the negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
50. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 241, 76 Stat. 872, 878 (repealed 1975);
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, 3 C.F.R. 513, 515 (1980).
51. See, e.g., PAUL H. DOUGLAS, IN THE FULLNESS OF TIME: THE MEMOIRS OF PAUL H. DOUGLAS
481-85 (1972) (describing Senator Douglas's shock at the behavior of the State
Department); Paul Lewis, Spotlight, Presidential Pick for Trade Talks Proves a quiet Man,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 1975), https://perma.cc/C3JS-TG8M (describing legislators' concern
that the State Department was "too soft on foreigners" when it came to trade
negotiations).
52. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 102(b)-(c), 88 Stat. 1978, 1982-83 (1975) (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b)(1), (c) (2018)).
53. Id. § 102(c), 88 Stat. at 1983 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112(c)).
54. 19 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4210; Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade
Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143, 145, 163 (1992); see also Edmund Walter Sim, Derailing
the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements, 5 FLA. INT'L L.J. 471, 493-505 (1990)
(discussing the fast track procedural process and the interaction between Congress and
the executive branch).
55. Trade Act of 1974 § 102(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112(a)).
56. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 19, 26, and 28 U.S.C.).
57. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 19, 26, and 28 U.S.C.).
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in 1988.58 Each of these statutes continued to promote executive-driven free
trade agreements, making fewer changes to other aspects of the trade law
regime.59
Further cementing the free trade norm, beginning in the 1980s, Congress
enacted a number of statutes that offered conditional, nonreciprocal lower
tariff benefits to selected developing countries under preference programs.60
The idea behind these statutes was to reward developing states for meeting
benchmarks set by Congress with lower or no duty treatment.6 1 At various
points, Presidents have suspended or terminated benefits to countries
benefiting from these programs.62
These delegations-those that promote the preference systems and those
that permit the President to engage in reciprocal trade agreements-have been
renewed on multiple occasions.63 Although fast track authority has occasionally
lapsed,64 Congress has repeatedly extended that authority in the interest of
58. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1102, 102 Stat.
1107, 1126-28 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2902).
59. In this Article I do not take up changes these omnibus acts made to trade remedies,
although even in that area the foundational rules are found in the Tariff Act of 1930.
Nevertheless, I exclude discussion of trade remedies as they implicate a different set of
considerations, such as the participation of industry and a detailed administrative
process with little to no discretion for the President.
60. See, e.g., African Growth and Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 106-200, tit. I, 114 Stat. 251,
252-75 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.); Andean Trade
Preference Act, Pub. L. No. 102-182, tit. II, 105 Stat. 1233, 1236-44 (1991) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206); Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369, 384-98 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19, 26,
and 33 U.S.C.); Trade Act of 1974, tit. V (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2467).
61. See, e.g., VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33663, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF
PREFERENCES (GSP): OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2, 9 (2019),
https://perma.cc/ZP64-7JCK (explaining the GSP rationale).
62. At least a dozen countries have had their GSP eligibility terminated or suspended at
various points, for example, for labor reasons. See Kimberly Ann Elliott, Peterson Inst. for
Intl Econ., Preferences for Workers? Worker Rights and the US Generalized System of
Preference, Speech for the Faculty Spring Conference: '98 "Globalization and Inequality"
Calvin College, Grand Rapids, Michigan (May 28, 1998), https://perma.cc/W9V8-D4WT
(naming by year of suspension or termination Nicaragua, Romania, Chile, Paraguay,
Burma, Central American Republic, Liberia, Sudan, Syria, Mauritania, Maldives, and
Pakistan (partial suspension)).
63. See, e.g., Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub.
L. No. 114-26, 129 Stat. 320 (codified in scattered sections of 19 and 26 U.S.C.); Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, tit. XXI, 116 Stat. 933,
993-1022 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
64. See, e.g., IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL33743, TRADE PROMOTION
AUTHORITY (TPA) AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 1 (2015),
https://perma.cc/2684-KUFT.
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negotiating bigger and better free trade agreements.65 Accordingly, since the
first half of the twentieth century, Congress and the executive branch have
pushed U.S. trade policy in the direction of trade liberalization and lower trade
barriers. By the end of the century, the United States and other countries had
written these free trade rules into broad international agreements.66
While this condensed synopsis paints a rosy picture about trade
liberalization winning the day over protectionism, this is not to suggest hat it
was all seamless-or that the process is complete. In the early days, Republicans
were loudly wary about both delegations to the President and the trade
agreements program.67 Some Democrats likewise have voiced considerable
concern about the impact of trade liberalization on workers and on industry.68
These detractions, while important and forceful, have not been substantial
enough to call into doubt the broader liberalization agenda that has dominated
U.S. trade policy for nearly one hundred years.69
But a review of U.S. trade law that lauds the triumph of a free trade agenda
over protectionism misses the fact that a different binary quietly emerged: one
that separates free trade from economic security, permitting through a back
door what appear to some to be dangerous protectionist measures.
B. Emergencies and Exceptions
Alongside these liberalizing delegations that empowered the President to
negotiate barriers down, Congress also created exceptional authorities that
permit the President to raise barriers up. This Subpart develops a typology for
identifying and locating the exceptions and emergency authorities and
demonstrates a shared foundation in ideas of economic security across the
types.
Upon inspection, two types of these exceptional delegations appear, hiding
in plain sight-one group of delegations permits the President to raise tariffs
65. See id. at 5-8.
66. SeeJEFFREY J. SCHOTT ET AL., PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., No. PB16-8, IMPLICATIONS
OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP FOR THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 9-11 (2016),
https://perma.cc/TQX3-4LWU; David A. Gantz, The TPP and RCEP: Mega-Trade
Agreements for the Pacific Rim, 33 ARIZ.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 57, 60 (2016).
67. See IRWIN, supra note 33, at 431; HENRYJ. TASCA, THE RECIPROCAL TRADE POLICY OF THE
UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN TRADE PHILOSOPHY 33-38 (1938).
68. These debates continue today, as can be seen in the negotiations of the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement. See, e.g., William Mauldin, Trump's New NAFTA Faces
Mounting Resistance in Democratic House, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2019, 7:42 PM ET),
https://perma.cc/V8C8-UG3L.
69. I.M. Destler recounts how both parties were able to embrace free trade because, for a
critical period, trade was not a major issue in political life. I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN
TRADE POLITICS 30-32 (4th ed. 2005).
1115
Trade's Security Exceptionalism
72 STAN. L. REV. 1097 (2020)
on the basis of dangers to "national security" or in the case of a "national
emergency," and another group permits the President o raise tariffs based on
criteria related to other nations' unfair treatment of, restrictions on, threats
toward, or discrimination against the U.S. economy. I refer to the former as
exceptional delegations with express security rationales, or "hard security
exceptions," and the latter as exceptional delegations with functional security
rationales, or "soft security exceptions." Taken together, all the exceptions rely
on a general concept of U.S. "economic security"-the meaning of which has
evolved over time.
Today, the term "economic security" integrates ideas of economic success,
dominance, independence, and hegemony that are consistent with the way
the term has been used as ideas of security and economic fairness have evolved
and become intertwined.70 The term captures notions of economic growth
and stability, as well as freedom from economic interference by adversaries.
But, as a concept, "economic security" belies a precise definition with hard
edges that can be clearly identified. The fuzziness in its content reflects
the nebulous nature of the statutory exceptions. In the case of the hard security
exceptions, often the statutory burden for demonstrating a "security" threat
is so low that the actual work that the concept of "security" is doing in
this space is considerably limited. Nevertheless, when invoking exceptions
of both types, Presidents and their designees regularly speak in terms that
reflect ideas of economic security.7 1 Congress likewise elaborated on the
70. As early as the 1990s, commentators noted that "the foreign policy establishment has
embraced the concept of 'economic security,"' as seen in the creation of the National
Economic Council, an economic counterpart to the National Security Council, and the
broader uses of economics and security. See, e.g., Russell Dean Covey, Note, Adventures
in the Zone of Twilight: Separation of Powers and National Economic Security in the Mexican
Bailout, 105 YALE L.J. 1311, 1334 & n.123 (1996). In 2011, the Congressional Research
Service pulled these ideas together for members of Congress. See DICK K. NANTO, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41589, ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: ISSUES AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 4-24 (2011), https://perma.cc/A9MC-7EX6. For a recent
iteration, see Aaron Mehta, Trump's National Security Strategy Unveiled, with Focus on
Economics, DEF. NEWS (Dec. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/E8TK-6UL2. The goal here is to
aggregate diverse ideas about "economic security" with the recognition that both words
of the term themselves encompass assorted ideas.
71. See, e.g., Isabelle Hoagland, Lighthizer Clarifies Section 232 "Program" to Probing Senators,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July 26, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://perma.cc/WU5X-FL3L ("[I]f you
decide that you need to protect an industry, you can't be [in] a position where the
protection is of no value.... [Ihf you've made a decision that it's in the national interest
to save the steel industry, then you have to put in place a program that actually works .... "
(first alteration in original) (quoting USTR Robert Lighthizer)); Andrew Preston,
President Trump Claims National Security Requires Tariffs. That's Not as Strange as It
Sounds., WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2018, 3:00 AM PDT), https://perma.cc/8ARX-ZR3Y
(commenting that "national security is about protecting America's values, morals,
culture and economy" and citing President Trump as saying, "[wie will defend our
people, our nations, and our civilization from all who dare to threaten our way of life,"
footnote continued on next page
1116
Trade's Security Exceptionalism
72 STAN. L. REV. 1097 (2020)
purpose of its delegation as being related to a broad umbrella of economic
security issues.72
The relationship between free trade and economic security gained
renewed popular attention73 with the Trump Administration's imposition of
tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum beginning in 2018.74 Despite this
present attention, the history of trade exceptionalism long precedes recent
events. In fact, as the following case studies show, the steel and aluminum
tariffs do not represent a new turn in trade as some have suggested, but rather
are a recent manifestation of the decades-old codification of security as exceptional.
1. Hard security exceptions
Each of the authorities that I discuss in this Subpart has what I call a "hard
security" component. That is, the statutes expressly state that the President
may act only if he has identified a threat to the U.S. national security. The case
study delegations presented here are the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)
and companion International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),
section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and section 201 of the Trade
Act of 1974. I describe them in brief here and return to discuss their complex
histories in Part II.
TWEA, 75 enacted in 1917, gives the President the power to oversee or
restrict any and all trade between the United States and its enemies "during the
while noting that "his rhetoric is little different from his predecessors"); Donald J.
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 10, 2017,2:43 AM), https://perma.cc/X6WP-
YUK2 ("The United States has been reminded time and again in recent years that
economic security is not merely RELATED to national security-economic security IS
national security. It is vital to our national strength."); Robert D. Williams, The
Commerce Department's Self-Defeating Conception of National Security, LAWFARE (Feb. 26,
2018,6:00 PM), https://perma.cc/5WG2-96WB (noting that China likewise has expanded
its definition of "national security" to include reference to maintaining competitive
advantages in critical industries).
72. See infra Part II. Members of Congress have also recently placed greater emphasis on
these terms. See Senators Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Counter International Predatory
Economic Practices: Legislation Would Require National Economic Security Strategy to
Ensure American Competitiveness, TODD YOUNG: U.S. SENATOR FOR IND. (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://perma.cc/2N9W-H96T.
73. See, e.g., America and China Are in a Proper Trade War, ECONOMIST (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://perma.cc/Q3YG-37ZF; Sean Rossman, What Is a Trade War? And Why Is Trump
Targeting China?, USA TODAY (updated Apr. 6, 2018, 2:08 PM ET), https://perma.cc/QHQ4-
WK6M; Ana Swanson, Trump's Trade War with China Is Officially Underway, N.Y. TIMES
(July 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/M24J-C6WN.
74. See RACHEL F. FEFER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45249, SECTION 232
INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5-14 (2020),
https://perma.cc/3WEC-J74Q.
75. Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 4301-4336, 4338-4341 (2018)).
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time of war."76 It was one of twenty-two statutes Congress passed enabling the
President to take control of private property for public use during World War I.77
Extensive in every respect, TWEA gave the President exceptional control over
private international economic transactions. It permitted the President to
"investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may
prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign
exchange ... by any person within the United States."78 Most of the extensive
presidential powers created during the war were repealed by 1921, but TWEA
was not.7 9 In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt relied on TWEA to
proclaim a bank holiday, suspending all transactions at all banking institutions
in the United States for four days,80 to "wage a war against the emergency" that
was the Great Depression.81 Given that the United States was not at war,
Roosevelt's invocation of TWEA was likely legally insufficient, but the
Congress effectively ratified his actions by passing the Emergency Banking
Relief Act three days later, which amended TWEA to be effective "[diuring
time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared by the
President."82 This amendment gave the President far-reaching authority to
declare a national emergency and then implement restrictions on trade and
exchange regardless of the existence of any war. TWEA was then used from
the 1930s through the 1960s as a tool for monetary policy and to implement
sanctions on foreign adversaries both during and outside of wartime.8 3
In 1971, President Nixon used TWEA in a new way: to place a 10% ad
valorem tariff on all goods entering the United States after he ended the
convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold.84 In 1977, in light of this unusual use of
76. First War Powers Act, ch. 593, § 301, 55 Stat. 838, 839-40 (1941) (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(1)(B)) (amending TWEA).
77. See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 3 (2019),
https://perma.cc/V7T8-CPXE; J. REUBEN CLARK, JR., EMERGENCY LEGISLATION PASSED
PRIOR TO DECEMBER, 1917 DEALING WITH THE CONTROL AND TAKING OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY FOR THE PUBLIC USE, BENEFIT, OR WELFARE 2, 8, 16, 18, 40 (1918).
78. Trading with the Enemy Act, § 5(b) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)).
79. See L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 98-505, NATIONAL EMERGENCY
POWERS 5 (2020), https://perma.cc/HQH5-ZHE9.
80. Proclamation No. 2039, reprinted in 48 Stat. 1689 (1933).
81. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Inaugural Address: March 4, 1933, in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 11, 15 (1938).
82. Emergency Banking Relief Act, ch. 1, § 2,48 Stat. 1, 1 (1933) (emphasis added).
83. CASEY ET AL., supra note 77, at 8.
84. Proclamation No. 4074, 3 C.F.R. 80 (1972); see also United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526
F.2d 560, 567, 570 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
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the statute as well as other political factors,85 Congress passed IEEPA. 86
Accompanying legislation reduced the TWEA's authority again to times of
war.87 At the same time, however, IEEPA recreated TWEA's peacetime
authority with more substantive guidance. Then and now, it allows the
President to declare "a national emergency" to deal with an "unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside
the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States."88 Today under IEEPA, the President may
investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and
compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding,
use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation, or exportation of ... any
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by
any person... subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
8 9
Since its inception, IEEPA has been used primarily for the U.S. sanctions
program.90 In 2019, however, President Trump threatened to use his authority
to put tariffs on goods imported from Mexico, citing an immigration
emergency on the southern U.S. border.91 Although, as of May 2020, those
tariffs have not been implemented, the announcement prompted a reconsideration
of whether Congress intended for the statute to be used in this way.92
Security issues arose in other congressional-executive trade delegations in
the 1950s when increasing dependence on foreign oil was perceived to threaten
national security.9 3 Oil and other raw materials were the impetus for what
became the "national security import restriction," known colloquially as
85. See H.R. REP. No. 95-459, at 3-5, 7 (1977) (concluding, after noting the tariff increase,
that TWEA had become "an unlimited grant of authority"); H. COMM. ON INT'L
RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., REVISION OF TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT 3 (Comm. Print
1977).
86. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. 11, 91 Stat. 1625,
1626-29 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2018)).
87. Amendments to the Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 102, 91 Stat.
1625, 1625 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4305).
88. International Emergency Economic Powers Act § 202(a) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)).
89. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
90. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 77, at 25-30; Stephanie Zable, What Comes After Tariffs: An
IEEPA Primer, LAWFARE (July 19, 2018, 3:12 PM), https://perma.cc/S76M-A22T.
91. Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to Address the Border Crisis,
WHITE HOUSE (May 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/P2H6-W3FW.
92. See Scott R. Anderson & Kathleen Claussen, The Legal Authority Behind Trump's New
Tariffs on Mexico, LAWFARE (June 3,2019, 4:19 PM), https://perma.cc/Q3DW-BVPC.
93. IRWIN, supra note 33, at 512, 517.
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"Section 232," in reference to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962-
the omnibus act that codified the concept.94
Section 232 of the Act 95 allows any public or private actor to request that
the Department of Commerce initiate an investigation as to whether an article
"is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security."96 The Department
may also initiate an investigation itself.9 7 Where the importation of a product
is found to threaten U.S. national security, the President can determine the
nature and duration of action that, "in the judgment of the President, must be
taken to adjust the imports of the article and its derivatives so that such
imports will not threaten to impair the national security."98 There is no limit
in the statute as to what types of tariffs or quotas the President may impose.
Section 232 does, however, require that the Secretary of Commerce and the
President,
in the light of the requirements of national security and without excluding other
relevant factors, give consideration to domestic production needed for projected
national defense requirements [and] ... anticipated availabilities of... raw materials ...
essential to the national defense.... In the administration of this section, the Secretary
and the President shall further recognize the close relation of the economic
welfare of the Nation to our national security ....
Twenty-four section 232 national security investigations were initiated on
or before 1994, one was initiated in 1999 and another in 2001, and then the
statute fell into disuse.lo Across those investigations, the Commerce
Department (or Treasury, in the early days) reached negative determinations in
94. See H.R. REP. No. 84-50, at 29 (1955) (expressing concern over the need to protect
"essential" industries "so that the Nation can quickly call upon them in time of
emergency"). The House Report states: "Preservation and expansion of domestic
sources of essential raw materials are also vital to our Nation's security. Yet, our
capacity to produce coal, oil, lead, zinc, tungsten, manganese, and a variety of other
raw materials, has been damaged by imports." Id. at 30; see also S. REP. No. 84-232, at 4
(1955); Jeffrey P. Bialos, Oil Imports and National Security: The Legal and Policy Framework
for Ensuring United States Access to Strategic Resources, 11 U. PA.J. INT'L Bus. L. 235, 241-42
(1990).
95. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 232, 76 Stat. 872, 877 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2018)).
96. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii).
99. Id. § 1862(d).
100. See BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS
PROGRAM GUIDE: THE EFFECTS OF IMPORTS ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY 13-20 (2007);
FEFER ETAL., supra note 74, at 3-4, app. B-1 (detailing past section 232 investigations and
actions taken by Presidents).
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sixteen instances.10 1 Presidents chose to take action on five occasions-all of
which were related to petroleum products or crude oil. 102 Since the start of the
Trump Administration, the Commerce Department has undertaken five
section 232 investigations.103 In 2018, following an investigation by the Commerce
Department in which the Department concluded that imports of steel and
aluminum posed a threat to national security, President Trump declared that
the United States was overly dependent on such imports, as they were
"essential for key military and commercial systems."104 The President imposed
tariffs on both products.105 He later deferred action on two additional
recommendations from the Commerce Department regarding threats to
national security posed by the importation of automobiles and auto parts and
by certain imports of uranium.106
Another provision with a hard security rationale is the safeguards
provision in section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.107 Safeguards are temporary
tariff measures intended to help a U.S. industry cope in the face of a sudden and
unexpected surge in imports of a particular product.108 The language of that
statute authorizes the President to take action where the U.S. International
Trade Commission (ITC), an independent agency, concludes after an investigation
that the sudden increase in imports of a particular product is a "substantial
cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry."109 The
President may then take "all appropriate and feasible action within his power
which the President determines will facilitate efforts by the domestic industry
101. FEFER ET AL., supra note 74, at 3-4, app. B-1. One was terminated before reaching any
decision. Id. at app. B-1.
102. Of these five decisions to take action, two were embargoes on oil from Iran and Libya,
in 1979 and 1982 respectively. Id. at 3. In one instance, instead of taking action on the
section 232 recommendation, the President deferred a formal decision and pursued
voluntary restraint agreements. Id. at app. B-1.
103. Id. at app. B-1.
104. Donald J. Trump, Proclamation No. 9704, 3 C.F.R. 39 (2019) (quoting the Secretary of
Commerce).
105. FEFERETAL., supra note 74, at app. B-1.
106. See RACHEL F. FEFER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10971, SECTION 232 AUTO
INVESTIGATION 1 (2020), https://perma.cc/ZE9A-8G8P; Brett Fortnam, Trump Sets Six-
Month Deadline to Negotiate Auto Deal with EU, Japan, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (May 17, 2019,
10:43 AM), https://perma.cc/8LZM-EBGN; Donald J. Trump, Memorandum on the Effect
of Uranium Imports on the National Security and Establishment of the United States Nuclear
Fuel Working Group, WHITE HOUSE (July 12,2019), https://perma.cc/68PS-79WF.
107. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201, 88 Stat. 1978, 2011-14 (1975) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (2018)).
108. Safeguard Actions, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://perma.cc/GA2D-E5JJ
(archived May 25, 2020).
109. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
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to make a positive adjustment to import competition."10 In considering what
action to take among all his powers, the statute directs the President to take
into account "the national security interests of the United States" along with
"other factors related to the national economic interest of the United States."111
Thus, this statute likewise allows the President to raise tariffs on goods, or
otherwise take action in the interest of economic security where an industry
faces serious injury.
Between 1975 and 2001, the ITC conducted seventy-three section 201
investigations.112 In twenty-six instances, Presidents acted on the ITC's
positive determination that imports were a threat to domestic industry by
implementing tariff increases or another type of trade restriction.113 No new
section 201 investigations were initiated between 2001 and the start of the
Trump Administration, however.114 On January 23, 2018, following two ITC
investigations, President Trump announced that he would impose section 201
tariffs on imports of large residential washing machines and solar silicon
photovoltaic cells and modules.115 Between that announcement and February
2019, these tariffs and tariff-rate quotas were applied to approximately $7.1 billion
worth of imported goods.11 6
2. Soft security exceptions
In contrast with the express security-focused statutes, U.S. trade law
features several statutes that delegate tariff-raising authority to the President
when the U.S. economy is burdened or restricted by the behavior of a U.S.
trading partner. Although these statutes do not have an explicit security
premise, they nevertheless erve the same function by permitting the President
to raise tariffs when he perceives a threat to U.S. commerce. Given the way
that Presidents and their designees have interpreted the open-ended delegation
110. Id.
III. Id. § 2253(a)(2)(F), (I).
112. BROCK R. WILLIAMS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45529, TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
TARIFF ACTIONS (SECTIONS 201, 232, AND 301): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 9 (2019),
https://perma.cc/UY5C-2CU8.
113. Id. The ITC reached negative determinations in thirty-three cases and Presidents chose
not to act in fourteen others. VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10786,
SAFEGUARDS: SECTION 201 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, at 2 (2018),
https://perma.cc/H747-BBU4.
114. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 112, at 9. This may have been because in 2003, dispute
settlement proceedings at the WTO led to the conclusion that President Bush's quotas
and tariff increases on steel imports were inconsistent with the United States's WTO
obligations (after which President Bush terminated the action). See id.
115. JONES, supra note 113, at 1.
116. See WILLIAMS ETAL., supra note 112, at 3.
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to determine whether there is a commercial threat or burden to the United
States, the broad umbrella term of "economic security" equally applies to the
deployment of these exceptions to raise tariffs.117 Even leaders from the
defense community have appropriated the functional security exceptions,
what I call here "soft security exceptions," as fitting tools for addressing
adversaries and allowing the United States to "stick up for" itself.118
One such statutory provision, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,119
requires the USTR, upon finding that "(1) an act, policy, or practice of a foreign
country is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United
States commerce, and (2) action by the United States is appropriate,"1 20 to
take all appropriate and feasible action authorized under subsection (c) ... and all
other appropriate and feasible action within the power of the President that the
President may direct the Trade Representative to take under this subsection, to
obtain the elimination of that act, policy, or practice. Actions may be taken that
are within the power of the President with respect to trade in any goods or
services, or with respect to any other area of pertinent relations with the foreign
country.
1 21
The statute authorizes the USTR to suspend trade concessions, impose duties
or other import restrictions, enter into a binding agreement with the country
in question, or take other action at the direction of the President.122
117. For a list of some of the ways President Trump has used the term, see note 71 above. See
also Isabelle Hoagland, Ross' EU Should Emulate China and Negotiate with U.S. if 232 Tariffs
Are Imposed, INSIDE TRADE (May 30, 2018, 9:57 AM), https://perma.cc/3TSH-LHZ9
("[Section 2321 isn't by any means confined strictly to military applications.... It's obviously
mainly not a direct military thing but infrastructure and the economy are what gives
you military security .... " (quoting U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross)). The use
of soft security exceptions to address Chinese intellectual property practices and the
use of a hard security exception to address global steel production contribute to the
perception that what were thought of as traditional commercial tools are being used for
national security threats and what were thought of as national security tools are being
used for commercial threats. Trump's USTR, Robert Lighthizer, mixes and matches,
for example, by referring to the action against China under section 301, a traditional
economic tool, as supporting U.S. economic security. See U.S.-China Trade: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 116th Cong. 6 (2019) (statement of Robert E.
Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Rep.) (noting that President Trump directed the Office of the
USTR to conduct a study under section 301 as part of a program to "defend our
workers, farmers, and ranchers and our economic system").
118. See A Conversation with Ash Carter, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 9, 2019),
https://perma.cc/9FVT-Y3WL [hereinafter Carter Interview].
119. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43 (1975) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2018)).
120. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
121. Id.
122. Id. § 241 1(b)-(c).
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Section 301 has been invoked over one hundred times in its history and,
according to certain experts, has effectively discouraged breaches of
international trade law or served as a deterrent for problematic trade behavior
by U.S. trading partners.123 Historically, most applications of the statute have
been triggered primarily by industry (rather than by self-petition by the
government),124 and of the more than one hundred petitions, the USTR
implemented trade restrictions in only sixteen prior to 2018.125 In 2018, the
USTR concluded, following an investigation, that China had engaged in acts,
policies, or practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and
innovation that are unreasonable or discriminatory and that burden or restrict
U.S. commerce.126 Acting on this conclusion, the President issued proclamations
directing the USTR to implement tariffs on a wide range of products imported
into the United States from China.127 Considering the scope of affected products,
this application of section 301 is by far the most momentous.
123. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 112, at 9; Warren Maruyama, Section 301 and the
Appearance of Unilateralism, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 394, 397-400 (1990); Alan 0. Sykes,
Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for
Section 301, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 263, 274 (1992) (discussing a theoretical analysis
of unilateral sanctions); see also A. Lynne Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Current
Development, Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement Under Section 301: At Odds with the W/TO?,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 675 (1996). Any interested individual may file a petition
requesting that action be taken under section 301. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a); see also Judith
Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Current Development, Significant Recent Developments
in Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases, 21 INT'L LAW.211, 213 (1987).
124. See U.S. Trade Representative, List of Section 301 Enforcement Petitions (n.d.),
https://perma.cc/DZL5-YE6P.
125. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 112, at 9; Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Section 301
Recent Developments and Proposed Amendments, 35 FED. B. NEWS & J. 68, 68-70 (1988)
(describing section 301 and illustrating some of its uses in the 1980s). As with section 201,
section 301 fell out of favor after the establishment of the WTO and after a WTO case
between the European Communities (EC) and the United States highlighted an
ongoing controversy about its consistency with the multilateral rules. See, e.g., Seung
Wha Chang, Taming Unilateralism Under the Multilateral Trading System: Unfinished Job
in the WTO Panel Ruling on U.S. Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 31 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1151, 1153-55 (2000); Kathleen Claussen, Can International Trade Law Recover?
Forgotten Statutes: Trade Law's Domestic (Re)turn, 113 AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 40, 41-42
(2019); John Gero & Kathleen Lannan, Trade and Innovation: Unilateralism v. Multilateralism,
21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 81, 81-82 (1995); Marjorie A. Minkler, Note, The Omnibus Trade Act of
1988, Section 301: A Permissible Enforcement Mechanism or A Violation of the United States'
Obligations Under International Law?, 11 J.L. & CoM. 283, 283 (1992).
126. Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301 Investigation of China's Laws,
Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property,
and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,099, 13,099-100 (Mar. 27, 2018); see also USTR
Updates Section 301 Investigation, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://perma.cc/KX8X-J8W5.
127. WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10708, ENFORCING U.S. TRADE LAWS:
SECTION 301 AND CHINA 2 (2019), https://perma.cc/CX8K-MGTB.
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Another soft security exception with a less well-known pedigree is section 338
of the Tariff Act of 1930.128 That section authorizes the President to impose
"new or additional duties" where the President finds that a country discriminates
against U.S. commerce "in such manner as to place the commerce of the United
States at a disadvantage compared with the commerce of any foreign country."129
The President can also authorize exclusion of articles if the country in question
maintains the discriminatory practice.130 Although section 338 has not been
used to impose tariffs on other countries, its use was threatened repeatedly in
foreign policy exchanges in the mid-twentieth century.13 1 Today, it rarely
comes up in trade policy discussions or scholarship,132 although it remains
available to the President. Certain other specialized exceptions with soft
security rationales likewise can be found throughout the broader trade
apparatus, such as those authorizing the President to act in case of currency
emergencies1 33 or agricultural necessity.134
This structural rendering as characterized by exceptions does not capture
perfectly all the nuance, political maneuverings, or external economic or
socioeconomic forces pushing and pulling on trade law. Generalizing in this
way has limitations, as any theoretical model or structural assessment would.
Not reflected here are the intentionality, agency, and political influences that
likewise matter in trade law and policy. Nevertheless, uncovering this
structure provides a heuristic from which trade experts, practitioners, and
policymakers can learn and engage and which I take up in Part III below. It
sheds light on longstanding debates in trade law and beyond, including with
respect to the separation of powers, as taken up in the next Subpart.
128. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 338, 46 Stat. 590, 704-06 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1338).
129. Id. § 338(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1338(a)).
130. Id. § 338(b) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1338(b)).
131. John K. Veroneau & Catherine H. Gibson, Note, Presidential Tariff Authority, 111 AM.J.
INT'L L. 957, 958 (2017). This authority was used against Germany and Australia during
the interwar period. Benjamin H. Williams, The Coming of Economic Sanctions into
American Practice, 37 AM.J. INT'L L. 386, 389 & n.3 (1943).
132. A Westlaw search of sources citing 19 U.S.C. § 1338 (under "Citing References," filtered
to "Secondary Sources," and then filtered to "Law Reviews") on May 10, 2020, yielded
only fourteen law review articles citing section 338.
133. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 122(a)(2), 88 Stat. 1978, 1987 (1975) (codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a)(2)).
134. See Agricultural Act of 1956, ch. 327, § 204, 70 Stat. 188, 200 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 1854 (2018)); Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, § 2, 48 Stat. 31, 32
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 602).
1125
Trade's Security Exceptionalism
72 STAN. L. REV. 1097 (2020)
C. Divergence in Delegation Disciplines
Examining trade law through this structural lens also illuminates a serious
disparity in the level of congressional control over its delegations, which is
another core point of this Article. When comparing the two groups of
delegations, congressional review over delegations related to economic
security is generally far less intensive than it is with those related to trade
liberalization. Congress uses different "trade delegation disciplines," as I term
them, with respect to one type of delegation versus the other, making the
exceptional delegations procedurally as well as substantively distinct.135 This
divergence in oversight reinforces the perception that free trade and economic
security are in contrast.
Congress typically has engaged one or more of four principal trade
delegation disciplines. They map onto a spectrum of stringency and constraint.
What is most noticeable is that the free trade norm is usually subject to the
most stringent congressional review while the exceptions are subject to
decreasing scrutiny. A number of practical implications flow from each
approach.
The first trade delegation discipline regularly used by Congress is to make
the President's trade action subject to congressional direction prior to, during,
or after the implementation of the President's action. Direct congressional
controls of this type can take a number of different forms. The most important
is TPA/fast track control used in the free trade delegation for negotiating trade
agreements. Under TPA/fast track in its current form, the President is required
to consult regularly with Congress and eventually to present to Congress an
implementing bill for the resulting trade agreement.136 Congress votes on the
agreement without any opportunity for amendment o the agreement itself. 137
In recent years, Congress has required extensive xecutive reporting and other
forms of engagement prior to its legislative implementation of a free trade
agreement.13 8 In fact, as I have written in prior work, when granting the
President authority to negotiate trade agreements, Congress puts considerable
constraints on the President and requires multiple presidential engagements
with Congress throughout the negotiation process.139 Those constraints have
135. Writing in 1986, Harold Koh analyzed various "congressional controls on presidential
trade policymaking," and examined the importance of the legislative veto as a
mechanism through which Congress could influence and oversee executive trade
policy. Koh, supra note 18, at 1191. I build on this valuable work here in light of
changes in trade law practice over the last thirty years. I use the word "discipline" to
convey a system of rules of conduct with connotations of controlled behavior.
136. 19 U.S.C. § 4203.
137. Id. § 4202(b)(3).
138. Id. §§ 4203-4204.
139. See Claussen, supra note 18, at 336-38.
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increased in each of the omnibus acts since the 1970s.140 As the President
started to engage in larger and more extensive trade agreements, Congress
sought to reel in that activity with specific and binding speedbumps-
procedural demands that allowed Congress to impress upon the President its
preferences and irect the President where members had concerns.141 Some of
these procedures included increased consultation through hearings, the
creation of new offices for reporting purposes, obligatory reports to relevant
committees, and express timelines.142 Ultimately, and most significantly in
terms of discipline, Congress maintains the final vote on whether a trade
agreement negotiated by the President and his designees will be implemented
into U.S. law.143
A further stringent trade delegation discipline that once figured
prominently in both the free trade delegations and the economic security
delegations has been erased from the law books. In 1983, the Supreme Court
dealt Congress a significant setback in its trade management system with INS v.
Chadha.144 That decision concluded that legislative vetoes-one of Congress's
"favorite administrative control device[sl"145-were unconstitutional.146 At the
time, legislative vetoes were baked into several trade statutes and acted as a
backstop against presidential action.147 Writing shortly after Chadha, Harold
Koh argued that despite the decision, but also partially because of it, Congress
remained heavily involved in managing presidential trade action, for example,
by voting on free trade agreements.148 Although Congress did maintain the last
140. Id.
141. Id. One notable exception to this trend is the delegation to the President to enter into
agreements that concern only tariff barriers. See 19 U.S.C. § 4202(a). There, Congress
has remained detached, which may suggest that it is the nontariff barriers of free trade
agreements, rather than just the fact of liberalization, that are motivating the increased
oversight. The tariff barrier delegation is so rarely used that it has not played a
significant role in trade lawmaking at least prior to the Trump Administration, but it
presents a distinction worth acknowledging. As I show below in Part II, though, this
delegation from which many of the liberalizing delegations have sprouted is ironically
rooted in a security premise.
142. See 19 U.S.C. § 4204.
143. Id. § 4205.
144. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
145. Koh, supra note 18, at 1210.
146. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959. A legislative veto is an action with legislative effect but not
accomplished through legislation and not requiring the President's signature. It is
either a simple resolution, accomplished through the majority vote of only one house,
or a concurrent resolution, accomplished through a vote of both houses, that
nonetheless alters or overrides completed executive action-in effect, vetoing an act of
the executive. See Koh, supra note 18, at 1196 n.16.
147. Koh, supra note 18, at 1196-1208.
148. Id. at 1210.
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word with respect to the implementation of trade agreements, Congress lost its
final oversight opportunity over the economic security delegations. That left
Congress with authorizations to the President o raise tariffs on the books, but
without ability to monitor or disallow any action the President would take.
Congress's other trade delegation disciplines provide far less supervision and it
is these that apply to the exceptions.
A second actively used trade delegation discipline is to make executive
action contingent on the findings of the ITC. In fact, the ITC's role is broader:
Congress has often granted authority to the ITC, an independent agency, to
carry out an investigation or conduct research into a question.149 Sometimes
the ITC will provide reporting to Congress and sometimes to the President, or
Congress will empower the ITC to take direct action without any political
interference. For example, with respect to section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930,150 an authority similar to section 338, the ITC may impose penalties
where it makes an affirmative determination about another country's trading
practice.15 1 In other instances, Congress has created a process shared between
the ITC and the Commerce Department. For example, in antidumping matters,
both agencies must reach an affirmative decision before action is taken.152 In
the case of section 338, the ITC provides information to the President that he
can accept or reject in making his decision.153
A third discipline is to give authority over tariff management to an
executive branch agency such as USTR or the Commerce Department. These
delegations follow a typical pattern: They provide that the President may take
action "whenever," following the determination of an agency, he finds that the
circumstances are warranted.154 The agency factfinding is often within the
149. For a description of the ITC's activities, see About the USITC, U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/J3UC-87U8 (archived Apr. 6, 2020).
150. Ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2018)).
151. Unfair competition under section 337 is one such area that is investigated by the ITC
with evidentiary hearings held before an administrative law judge. See Understanding
Investigations of Intellectual Property Infringement and Other Unfair Trade Practices in
Import Trade (Section 337), U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/LW5U-
HX4E (archived Apr. 6, 2020).
152. See VIVIAN C. JONES & CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10018, TRADE
REMEDIES: ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/N57S-
AQ4R.
153. See 19 U.S.C. § 1338(a), (g). The statute is ambiguous as to whether the President could
make the factual finding on his own without any determination by the ITC. See
Veroneau & Gibson, supra note 131, at 959. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 is
somewhere between an ITC contingency and an executive branch agency delegation in
that it gives the ITC investigating authority, but action is then taken at the discretion
of the President. For an overview, see generally JONES, supra note 113.
154. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43 (1975)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
footnote continued on next page
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agency's control, and thus, although managed by civil servants, is highly
subject to political overtones. Having agencies as custodians of process
provides some distance from the White House, but only so much given that the
heads of these agencies are political appointees shaping policy for the President.
Nearly all the major trade acts in the second half of the twentieth century
established these processes, including those for several of the exceptions
discussed in this Article.155 In the early 1990s, commentators noted with
concern that under these conditions, a President could use a statute like section 301
opportunistically or imprudently.156 Despite these apprehensions, no additional
oversight mechanisms were added at that time.157 Similarly, although section 232
requires an investigation, and that the work be carried out by an executive
agency, not the President, the President can disregard the recommendation of
the agency and impose tariffs anyway.158 Further, in this configuration, the
President's decision is subject to very limited judicial review. Stopping presidential
794, § 232, 76 Stat. 872, 877 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862); Tariff Act of 1930,
§ 337 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337). Some have said that the statutory language still
permits action against "virtually any trade practice the USTR wishes to attack." Sykes,
supra note 123, at 305-06. Despite the capaciousness in the overall delegations, Congress
has added certain procedural constraints, particularly on section 232 in the years
following its original enactment. Some of those procedural constraints have been
noted by the Court of International Trade in recent months. See, e.g., Transpacific Steel
LLC v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1275-76 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2019); see also infra
note 167.
155. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 154.
156. See, e.g., Robert E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 113, 122 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) (asserting that one
needs a diagram to trace all the authorities of section 301, a section that makes up an
"intricate maze" with "extremely wide loopholes"); Sykes, supra note 123, at 306.
157. The statute received technical amendments in later years, but those had no bearing on
the scope of the delegation. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015,
Pub. L. No. 114-125, §§ 602(b)(1), 607, 130 Stat. 122, 184, 189 (2016) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411); Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
295, § 20(c)(4), 110 Stat. 3514, 3528 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411); Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §§ 314(a)-(c), 621(a)(9), 108 Stat. 4809, 4939-
40, 4993 (1994) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411). Originally section 301 was an
authority delegated to the President. Trade Act of 1974 § 301. In the 1980s, the investigative
power shifted to the USTR and with that some discretionary provisions were added.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102 Stat.
1107, 1164-76.
158. See David Scott Nance & Jessica Wasserman, Regulation of Imports and Foreign Investment
in the United States on National Security Grounds, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 926, 932-35 (1990)
(explaining in detail the Commerce Department's process under section 232). Despite
this presidential discretion, Congress did, in the first decades of section 232's existence,
add certain procedural disciplines that should not be discounted. See supra note 154;
infra text accompanying note 221. They are limited, however, by the program's limited
transparency.
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action, apart from procedural irregularities, likely would require a change to
the law or a judicial decision either that the underlying exception is
unconstitutional or that the President has exceeded the bounds of the
delegation-approaches courts have yet to embrace.159
Fourth, with respect to certain exceptions, Congress sometimes delegates
exceptional trade authority directly to the President with little to no
procedural check or control.160 This type of blank check is perhaps most easily
seen in IEEPA. Recall that IEEPA allows the President to declare a national
emergency at his sole discretion and to subsequently take a wide range of
actions.16 1 The primary oversight mechanism used by Congress in IEEPA is to
require the President to consult with Congress, including through follow-up
reports, prior to acting.162 Emergencies also automatically expire after one
year unless the President notifies Congress of a renewal.163 Otherwise, the
President is free to act unchecked.
Finally, although the President's actions under any of the hard or soft
security exceptions could be subject to international review at the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the United States could claim, and recently has
claimed, that its actions are protected by the WTO's own security exception
discussed below in Part II. 164 As a result, institutional scrutiny in Geneva poses
159. See, e.g., Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559-60 (1976) (holding
that section 232 "easily fulfills the "intelligible principle" test set out in J. W Hampton, Jr.,
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928), and that there was "no looming problem of
improper delegation"). However, a new nondelegation challenge is now underway. Am.
Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1344-45 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2019) (finding that the court was bound to uphold the delegation because of precedent),
aff'd, No. 2019-1727, 2020 WL 967925 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 28, 2020), petition for cert. filed,
No. 19-1177 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2020); see also United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560,
582-84 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding that Congress's delegation in the Trading with the
Enemy Act was not an unconstitutional one).
160. See, e.g., International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2018).
Josh Chafetz has rightly argued that the President is nevertheless always subject to at
least some check even if unseen or subjective, political, or reputational. See JOSH
CHAFETZ, CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS, 45-77, 201-31 (2017) (referring to hard tools like appropriations and soft tools
like speech).
161. See supra Part I.B.1.
162. 50 U.S.C. § 1703.
163. Id. § 1622(d). An emergency can be terminated through a joint resolution as well, but as
a joint resolution is signed into law by the President, Congress could end an emergency
declared by the President contrary to the President's position only by overriding a veto.
Id. § 1622(c).
164. In fact, the United States has used other countries' retaliation against its security-
premised tariffs as justification for offensive dispute settlement proceedings at the
WTO. See, e.g., Jack Caporal, U.S. Initiates WTO Disputes over Retaliation to Section 232
Tariffs, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July 19, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://perma.cc/X9CF-PZ6M.
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little threat of meaningful discipline over the President's actions.165 The U.S.
courts have likewise upheld broad-reaching presidential trade action.166
In sum, Congress has almost exclusively increased its control over the
President in the negotiation of free trade agreements, while using far less
intense delegation disciplines with respect to the exceptions, in part as a result
of the Supreme Court's action against the legislative veto in Chadha. Since the
late 1980s, little legislative action has been undertaken to significantly alter the
disciplines that oversee executive application of the powerful exceptional
delegations.167
II. Assessing Exceptionalism in Theory and in Practice
How does U.S. trade law's exceptionalist structure influence the shape of
our trade policy? As others have noted, institutional structure shapes
decisionmaking.168 But, given the absence of scholarly discussion of this
modeling of U.S. trade law, we still lack clear assessments of its efficacy. Legal
exceptionalism, as I use the term, is undertheorized and underdeveloped across
issue areas, despite the fact that exceptions are abundant in U.S. law.169 The
same is true in international law: Many international obligations are subject to
165. See Kathleen Claussen, Trade War Battles: The International Front, LAWFARE (July 27,
2018, 11:16 AM), https://perma.cc/JG84-H76N (listing several dispute settlement requests
brought by the United States against trading partners at the WTO).
166. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 684-88 (1981) (upholding executive
orders under IEEPA to suspend claims of American nationals against Iran); Fed. Energy
Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1976) (holding that imposing a
system of monetary exactions in the form of license fees was a valid exercise of the
President's delegated authority under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962);
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412-13 (1928) (upholding the
delegation to the President of the authority to make tariff adjustments, used here to
levy a tariff on imported barium oxide in excess of that set by statute, under the Tariff
Act of 1922); Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 690-92 (1892) (upholding the
President's exercise of authority delegated to him under the Tariff Act of 1890 and the
delegation itself); U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 683 F.2d 399, 404-05 (C.C.P.A.
1982) (upholding the President's proclamation on tariffs as a valid exercise of delegated
authority); United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 580-84 (C.C.P.A. 1975)
(upholding the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation made under TWEA).
167. There has been some movement among agencies and some limited enhanced
procedural mechanisms like the imposition of timelines. See, e.g., Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, sec. 1301(a), § 304(a)(2)-(4), 102 Stat.
1107, 1170-72 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2414 (2018)); id. sec. 1501, 102 Stat. at
1257-60 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1862).
168. For an example relevant to this study, see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245,2341-42 (2001).
169. Exceptionally, see Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 871-72 (1991).
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exceptions,170 although, despite their ubiquity, there is no systematic study of
exceptions in international law. There are likewise no up-to-date scholarly
accounts that seek to theorize U.S. trade law or understand its structure.
This Part seeks to start to fill these gaps by developing a positive theory of
trade's security exceptionalism. It also considers under what circumstances
trade exceptionalism may be useful and when it may not. In so doing, this Part
addresses the payoffs of the exceptionalist approach as compared to alternative
visions for managing free trade and economic security. We may not be able to
identify a single best institutional framework for achieving economic security
goals while furthering free trade norms, but we can evaluate the statutory
structure brought to light in Part I against other options.
A fundamental difficulty of such an assessment is the mixed narrative
about what the exceptions seek to achieve and what they have achieved in
practice. From one perspective, giving the President special permission to
depart from a primary norm in case of security presumes that security is not
part of the primary norm or that the primary norm cannot accommodate
security needs. As this Part shows, the story is more complicated than that: Not
only is the history of the codified exceptions itself muddled, but also the
leading contributions in political science and in history discredit the
perception that free trade and economic security authorities are, were intended
to be, or ought to be in opposition.
In addition, examining the efficacy of an exceptionalist approach to
managing trade and economic security is still more challenging in light of the
diverse ways and contexts in which exceptions may be and have been
deployed. This is not an extensive survey of applications. While numerous
examples exist in which exceptions have been used, the reasons for a particular
outcome may nonetheless be overdetermined. Regardless, it is possible to
deduce from an understanding of the inner workings of trade law how the
availability of the exceptions may have an impact on internal levers of
decisionmaking, and thus the influence the exceptions are likely to exert. This
Part considers especially whether explanations consistent with certain leading
analytical theories help explain the advantages of and justifications for trade
exceptionalism.
170. Scholars have studied these individually at length. See, e.g., Daniel P. King, The Political
Offence Exception in International Extradition, 13 COMP. & INT'L L.J .S.AFR. 247, 248 (1980);
Joyiyoti Misra & Roman Jordans, Confidentiality in International Arbitration: An
Introspection of the Public Interest Exception, 23 J. INT'L ARB. 39, 40-42 (2006); Michael P.
Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 507, 508 (1999); Donald N. Zillman, Energy Trade and the National
Security Exception to the GATT, 12 J.ENERGY & NAT.RESOURCEs L. 117, 117-19 (1994).
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A. The Efficacy of Exceptionalism: Possible Theories
Having separate tracks of delegations to the President for free trade and for
economic security could promote both free trade and economic security in
certain scenarios. For example, an open economy politics (OEP) justification of
trade exceptionalism could entail a protectionist Congress tying its hands by
delegating powers to a President who is assumed, by virtue of his nationwide
constituency and responsibility for U.S. trade diplomacy, to be less prone to
protectionist temptation, and hence less prone to abuse the exceptions.17 1
Further, OEP theory would suggest that, when it comes to security, Congress
may find that the President is in the best position to assess uch issues. Because
of the President's security-related expertise, he can act quickly-quicker than
Congress-to address threats of which he is uniquely aware. This theory would
help explain why Congress delegates to the President on both the free trade
track and on the exception track. It provides a rationale for giving the
President full control over tariff authority.172
In international diplomacy, it may be to the national advantage to have a
tool such as tariffs in the President's foreign policy arsenal to give the President
credibility and leverage in conversations with adversaries. The exceptions
relax strict legal controls to enable the President to respond to external threats.
They are necessarily left open ended given the potential scope of unknowable
threats. Congress may wish to allow the President to be able to use tariffs as a
171. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GLOBAL GAME: A NEW LOOK AT U.S.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING 40-47 (2001) (observing how removing
power from Congress made trade liberalization possible); see also DESTLER, supra note 69,
at 14 (arguing that members of Congress delegated authority to "protect[] themselves[]
from the direct, one-sided pressure from producer interests that had led them to make
bad trade law"). But see Michael J. Hiscox, The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional
Reform, and Trade Liberalization, 53 INT'L ORG. 669, 677 (1999) (arguing that the idea that
"any president, by dint of having a larger constituency, must be less protectionist than
the median member of Congress, is hopelessly ahistorical").
OEP emerged out of the school of international political economy in the late 1990s. See
David A. Lake, Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review, 4 REV. INT'L ORG. 219, 224-25
(2009); Thomas Oatley, Open Economy Politics and Trade Policy, 24 REV. INT'L POL. ECON.
699, 699-700 (2017). OEP adopts assumptions of neoclassical economics and seeks to
provide a bridge between economics and political science-making it a ripe theory for
understanding U.S. trade law. Central to OEP theory is conceiving of political
institutions as entities of aggregate interests, taking those interests as fundamental
building blocks to how policies are formed. Lake, supra, at 224-25.
Economists have also examined the roles of special interest groups in the trade
lawmaking and policymaking spaces. Most notably, Gene Grossman and Elhanan
Helpman's work in the mid-1990s provided a foundation for understanding how the
branches work together with industry and their lobbies. See Gene M. Grossman &
Elhanan Helpman, Protection for Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 833, 834-35 (1994).
172. But see Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1248 (2006) (criticizing the OEP view as lacking support).
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stick with competitors to indicate that they could face economic injury should
they not comply with U.S. demands. From this perspective, such a structure
may give the United States a method to make real-time adjustments that
motivate trading partners to comply with international rules.
It could be, likewise, that economic security exceptions are necessary, if
not advantageous, for getting buy-in from the executive to administer trade
policy. Congress may find it useful to delegate some security-premised authority
to the President as a way of managing the relationship between the legislative
and executive branches in a delicate and politically sensitive area. By regulating
economic security, Congress maintains some degree of control where the
absence of any escape ramp could be seen to push the President to undertake
extralegal tools in his capacity as commander in chief.
This view is consistent with rational design theories that are prevalent
in international relations, where security exceptions have been studied
extensively.173 There, the conventional wisdom is that exceptions, including in
international trade,174 allow states to sign on to international agreements
secure in the knowledge that unexpected developments of adverse rulings will
not pose unacceptable shocks to their vital interests.175 At the international
level, the primary exception of relevance to this work is Article XXI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), finalized in 1947.176 The
original twenty-three contracting parties to GATT agreed to a baseline of
tariff concessions and rules designed to prevent these concessions from being
frustrated by individual members' inclination toward protectionist measures.
173. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging W/TO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. REV.
697, 699-700; Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the Use of the
WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New
Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 413, 426 (2001);
Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATT's Security
Exception, 12 MICH.J. INT'L L. 558,560 (1991).
174. See Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard"- A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape
Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 282 (1991) (arguing that the
purpose of safeguard authority is to permit officials to "escape" from tariff concessions
when the "political gains to officials in the importing country 'outweigh' the costs to
the officials in the exporting country").
175. See Alford, supra note 173, at 702; Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International
Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 658-59 (2006)
(discussing how overly capacious flexibility provisions may engender opportunistic
behavior).
176. GATT, supra note 16, art. XXI, 61 Stat. A63, 55 U.N.T.S. 266. The United States was the
primary advocate for the national security exception, as it would come to be known, in
the course of the negotiations of the Havana Charter, the precursor agreement to the
GATT that was intended to establish the ultimately failed International Trade
Organization. See Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, Trade Multilateralism and U.S. National
Security: The Making of the GATT Security Exceptions, 41 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 118, 129
(2020).
1134
Trade's Security Exceptionalism
72 STAN. L. REV. 1097 (2020)
Article XXI, drafted by the United States, codified a security justification for
departure from the rules under broad, even if enumerated, circumstances.177
Rational design theorists assert that this exception was added because it
was the best way to get states to agree, notwithstanding their eluctance about
international institutions and their desire to maintain their sovereignty.17 8
Under a rational design view, exceptions are necessary as a sort of safety valve
to avoid exit from the regime.179 At the domestic level, enabling the President
to take tariff measures in case of security concerns could also have the effect of
incentivizing him to use economic tools over military options in cases of
interstate conflict.180
There may also be benefits of an exceptionalist structure for preserving
free trade in case of a true military threat. Exceptional authorities may be
critical for circumstances in which tariff adjustments are legitimately needed
to permit the United States to be prepared for warfare.
177. GATT, supra note 16, art. XXI, 61 Stat. A63, 55 U.N.T.S. 266. The exception was not
created from whole cloth; security exceptions had featured in earlier U.S. trade
agreements, and the same exception appears in most bilateral and regional trade
agreements in force today. See SEBASTIAN MANTILLA BLANCO & ALEXANDER PEHL,
NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS: JUSTICIABILITY AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 (2020) (ebook); KENNETH J.
VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND INTERPRETATION
179-86 (2010). Some WTO agreements also provide for emergencies, albeit in a
different way from those found in U.S. law. These take on different names. See, e.g., PETER
VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: TEXTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 630, 630-31, 655, 658-59 (2017)
(discussing safeguard measures and balance-of-payments measures under WTO
agreements).
178. For a popular summary on the trade exceptions that gets to this point, see Paul
Krugman, Opinion, A Trade War Primer, N.Y. TIMEs (June 3,2018), https://perma.cc/UCA4-
AVKZ ("Why are there exceptions? Political realism, again. The creators of the trading
system realized that it needed some flexibility....").
179. Alford, supra note 173, at 698; Holger P. Hestermeyer, Article XXI Security Exceptions, in
WTO: TRADE IN GOODS 569, 579-80 (Riidiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2010). On rational
design generally, see Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International
Institutions, in THE RATIONAL DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 2 (Barbara
Koremenos et al. eds., 2003).
180. In some ways, however, rational design theory's insights from the international sphere
are inapposite in the domestic space. Whereas at the international level, states may
need buy-in to build international institutions in which they give up some of their
sovereignty, at the domestic level, no similar buy-in is clearly required between the
two branches and there is no widespread power differential between the actors.
Further, the nature of the exceptions differs because in international law, the exception
is available as an excuse from liability or a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, whereas
in domestic law there are no liability concerns for any party. Rather, in domestic law,
the exception converts what would be unlawful executive action into lawful executive
action.
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Less deliberate reasons for using exceptions could be that market actors
and global economic trends force the hand of Congress or that this structure
simply serves U.S. and global markets best. It may be that the development of
dominant free trade principles is a natural, market-driven outcome and that
the exceptions are best viewed as forms of state intervention seeking to push
back on those forces cautiously and where possible.18 1 Testing that theory would
be challenging, as competing evaluations of the present trade war already
reveal.182
As a practical matter, though, lessons from the applications of the
exceptions, recent and not recent, indicate that segregating trade and security
delegations in these terms also has risks, especially in the absence of equivalent
delegation disciplines.
B. Risks and Shortcomings
Lawmakers and scholars have long recognized the intersection between
security and trade to be a potential flashpoint for political and societal dispute.
Raj Bhala, writing in the 1990s, set out the concern that security and free trade
may be incompatible with the growth of a rule-of-law paradigm in trade.183
Since that time, however, those concerns appeared to have tapered off. In the
last twenty years, trade peace and U.S. hegemony together with the rise of the
WTO cabined those questions or channeled them into the multilateral trade
law regime-at least until 2016, when those concerns resurfaced. This Subpart
considers the possible downsides of trade's security exceptionalism. While
exceptions are common in the law, the manner through which trade's security
exceptions have been applied highlights the risks of the underlying structure
that permits such an exercise.
181. Harlan Cohen helpfully contrasts this view with other areas of international law and
foreign relations such as human rights, where state action is dominant and
international action is an exceptional response to state failure. See Harlan Cohen,
Structured by Power, Directed by Law, Torn Between Concepts (Mar. 2019)
(unpublished comment) (on file with author).
182. See, e.g., Chris Prentice et al., Factbox: Winners and Losers in Trump's Trade War with
China, REUTERS (June 19, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/HR8V-DPJ7 (reflecting that
some companies are finding the trade war helpful and that others are not).
183. Raj Bhala, National Security and International Trade Law: What the GATT Says, and What
the United States Does, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 263, 264 (1998) ("The new threats to the
United States' national security, and the highly controversial legislation the United
States has enacted to preserve national security, raise a fundamental problem for
international trade lawyers, who may be inclined to view the boundaries of their field
as narrow."). The Obama Administration's invigorated use of the WTO in lieu of
unilateral tools may have (falsely) tempered those concerns. See Charlie Anderson,
President Obama on Enforcing Trade Rules: What You Need to Know, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG
(Sept. 13, 2016, 6:00 PM ET), https://perma.cc/46ZQ-VBRQ.
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First and most obviously, exceptionalizing one tool over another, without
more, risks that the President will convert the exception to the rule.
Converting the exception to the rule could involve legitimate applications of
the statute, but to excess. The legalization of a security exception may, in
certain circumstances, give license for behavior contrary to congressional
aims, particularly where the executive does not share the same stance on the
primary norm as Congress. Where the executive does not share the congressional
position on the primary norm, an exception that supports a contrasting norm
invites the executive to promote its contrasting norm.184
A second risk to exceptionalizing economic security from the rest of trade
law is the creation of more friction between the branches in an area already
fraught with sensitivities. Because the exceptions seek to navigate the fuzzy
constitutional line between foreign affairs authority and foreign commerce
authority-each ostensibly directed to a different branch-they risk
contributing to a bilateral power struggle. Exceptionalizing from a primary
norm through allocations of authority that may border on the President's
inherent authority brings the branches together in potential clash.
Then there is the "give a mouse a cookie" danger. That is, granting the
President these many exceptions creates a network of powers that the
executive can use to manage fully and direct trade policies beyond
congressional reach. American Presidents have attempted to increase their
political leverage over the tariff by defining it, at least in part, as a foreign
policy issue.185 David Lake comments that "[bly appealing to his position as the
principal foreign policy decision maker, each president increased his legitimate
authority in the tariff-making process."186 In some instances, a narrow
exception became larger and less constrained in later iterations.18 7
Statutory delegations of this sort also could create considerable path
dependence and political paralysis.188 It is much harder to take back an
184. Destler noted this concern: "By making protection the 'exceptional' recourse in the
'normal' process of trade-barrier reduction, the escape clause kept the quasi-judicial
form of the old flexible tariff but turned the substance on its head." DESTLER, supra note 69,
at 22. These tools made the United States look like it was moving toward protectionist
policy positions. Indeed, if they were used regularly, they would have had a
protectionist result. Id. at 36-37.
185. See Meyer & Sitaraman, supra note 12, at 653-54.
186. LAKE, supra note 33, at 199.
187. For example, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 was originally a short, mandatory
delegation cabined by a legislative veto. See Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 301-302, 88 Stat. 1978,
2041-43 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2412 (2018)). Following INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the veto backstop was lost. When the statute was next
revisited, Congress created greater discretion for the executive. See supra note 157.
188. See Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 251, 259 (2000).
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empowering delegation in the face of a likely veto. In the international
context, most states consistently include exceptions, especially national
security exceptions, in their agreements.189 Exceptions easily become intractable.
Moreover, while there may be some advantage to using economic tools over
military options, exceptionalism may actually encourage a shift toward economic
tools to fight geopolitical battles that could be resolved in other ways. Those
other ways, whether diplomatic or otherwise, may be less harmful to the
national or global economy than tariffs would be. It is not clear that economic
institutions can sustain the weight of the additional pressure put on them as an
alternative to combat warfare.190
Finally, underlying many of the abovementioned concerns is a more
general risk that an exception without sufficient discipline could lead to abuse.
For exceptionalism not to undermine a legal regime, the costs of opportunism
and institutional competition on the part of the President must be greater than
the gains of application. Some politicians have expressed concern about this
possibility during the Trump Administration,19 1 but it has been a risk for the
lifetime of the exceptions. A former Commerce Department official involved
in the negotiations surrounding a section 232 investigation from 1983 described
the investigation process as a sham: "It is based on a scenario... and depending
on the scenario, you can predict the result."192
C. Inconsistent Antecedents
The dichotomization of free trade and security is also inconsistent with
well-established understandings that free trade, rather than being security's
antithesis, is a source of or tool for economic security.193 These other narratives
189. MANTILLA BLANCO & PEHL, supra note 177, at 1.
190. See Cohen, supra note 181, at 4-5 (discussing tension between the two).
191. For one, Senator Tim Kaine characterized the Trump Administration's use of the
security exception as "an abuse of power" and voiced the need "to protect the American
economy by ensuring Congress reclaims its oversight of trade decisions." Jordain
Carney, Democrats Introduce Bill to Rein in Trump on Tariffs, HILL (Mar. 27, 2019, 11:30 AM
EDT), https://perma.cc/Q2G3-ZLX5.
192. Craig Anderson Lewis, Note, Waiting for the Big One: Principle, Policy, and the Restriction
of Imports Under Section 232, 22 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 357, 368 (1991) (quoting Issues
Relating to the Plastic Injection Molding Industry: Hearing Before the Readiness Subcomm. of
the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 100th Cong. 83-84 (1988) (statement of Clyde Prestowitz,
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)).
193. This theme is prevalent in political science and history. For a quick summary of these
areas, see generally Jonathan E. Hillman, Commentary, Trade Wars and Real Wars,
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/AH76-V8UW
(describing the longstanding link between commerce and security). See also Joanne
Gowa & Edward D. Mansfield, Power Politics and International Trade, 87 AM. POL. ScI.
REV. 408, 416-17 (1993) (concluding that free trade is more likely within geopolitical
alliances); Christine Margerum Harlen, A Reappraisal of Classical Economic Nationalism
footnote continued on next page
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have been central to U.S. trade policy since the Founding. The normative
payoff of each vision is reflected in the alternative decisionmaking and
policymaking structure each counsels for the trade-security relationship.
In the nation's earliest days, the tariff, not free trade, was a critical source
of security. At a time when the success of the independent nation was still
uncertain, the need for economic independence drove a high tariff.194 A policy
of protectionism was regarded by the nation's leaders as critical for national
defense.195 In the nineteenth century, the link between protectionism and
independence became more pronounced in the context of the War of 1812,
when a strong sense of nationalism and a concern for the country's defense
crystallized around protection of manufacturing.196 Articulating this relationship
was "decisive in ensuring support for the tariff in the South."197
By the early part of the twentieth century, however, the global economy
had changed, as had the place of the United States in the world. Commerce and
security remained linked, but it was then that free trade and the reduction of
barriers to commerce began to be seen as a source of and tool for security.
Economists had long recognized that free markets and free trade could serve as
a source of national security.198 Political theorists likewise had developed this
foundational principle for centuries.199 It was this motivation that led Secretary
and Economic Liberalism, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 733, 733-35, 742-43 (1999) (revisiting the
classical binary between economic liberalism and nationalism).
194. See WILLIAM HILL, THE FIRST STAGES OF THE TARIFF POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, 43-
58, 107-09 (Balt., Guggenheimer, Weil & Co. 1893).
195. See James R. Sofka, The Jeffersonian Idea of National Security: Commerce, the Atlantic
Balance of Power, and the Barbary War, 1786-1805,21 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 519, 520-21 (1997).
196. See IRWIN, supra note 33, at 129 (describing how leaders like Henry Clay believed that
the country's national security depended on ending foreign dependence on critical
supplies "such as boots and clothing, arms and munitions").
197. Id. at 131.
198. See Edward D. Mansfield & Jon C. Pevehouse, Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International
Conflict, 54 INT'L ORG. 775, 775-76 (2000); Solomon William Polachek, Conflict and
Trade, 24 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 55, 59-60 (1980).
199. See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, The Concept of Interest: From Euphemism to Tautology, in
RIVAL VIEWS OF THE MARKET SOCIETY AND OTHER RECENT ESSAYS 35, 43-44 (1992)
(outlining the thesis of doux commerce, the idea of sweet or gentle commerce, which
"held that commerce was a powerful civilizing agent" that would diffuse "virtues
within and among trading societies"); Michael W. Doyle, Three Pillars of the Liberal
Peace, 99 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 463, 463 (2005) (reviewing the intellectual history of
this idea from Kant); see also Stephen J. Rosow, Commerce, Power and Justice: Montesquieu
on International Politics, 46 REV. POL. 346, 347, 361 (1984). A competing idea is
that trade increases international tensions, altering the balance of power between
competing states by allowing quicker development of military rivals. John Maynard
Keynes, National Self-Sufficiency, 22 YALE REV. 756, 757-58 (1933) (arguing for reducing
international entanglement for the sake of peace); see also Harlan Grant Cohen,
footnote continued on next page
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of State Cordell Hull to seek to promote free trade for more than twenty
years. Hull attributed war and the risk of war to economic rivalry, particularly
with respect to access to foreign markets and competitive behavior to secure
access to raw materials.200 Hull "came to believe that if we could eliminate this
bitter economic rivalry, if we could increase commercial exchanges among
nations over lowered trade and tariff barriers and remove unnatural
obstructions to trade, we would go a long way toward eliminating war itself."20 1
Seen as naive and idealistic by some of his contemporaries,202 Hull nevertheless
advocated tirelessly for ending barriers to trade of all types in the interest of
peace.203
In later years, trade came to be seen as a tool of security. This idea
undergirded reciprocal trade agreements and propelled the trade agreements
program forward in the face of Republican opposition and lingering
protectionism. For example, the justification for the trade agreements
program changed in the years after 1934 to "countering the growing threats
to world peace."204 During World War II, Hull argued for the renewal of the
RTAA on the basis that "[ulnless we continue to maintain our position of
leadership in the promotion of liberal trade policies ... the future will be dark
indeed."205
In the 1980s, theorist John Ruggie likewise developed his influential
embedded liberalism narrative, premised on the idea that foreign economic
policy has been embedded within a particular conception of security, often
defined in terms of economic independence, and that efforts to liberalize trade
Editorial Comment, Multilateralism's Life Cycle, 112 AM. J. INT'L L. 47, 48-49 (2018)
(arguing that recent antiglobalist turns are a result of multilateralism's successes).
200. Hull saw competition over raw materials as a source of conflict and commerce as a tool
for peace. 1 CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 84 (1948) ("I saw that you
could not separate the idea of commerce from the idea of war and peace ... [and] that
wars were often largely caused by economic rivalry conducted unfairly.").
201. Id.
202. IRWIN, supra note 33, at 422.
203. 1 HULL, supra note 200, at 81-85. Hull later wrote: "I have never faltered ... in my belief
that the enduring peace and the welfare of nations are indissolubly connected with
friendliness, fairness, equality, and the maximum practicable degree of freedom in
international economic relations." Cordell Hull, U.S. Sec'y of State, Address on the
Occasion of the Presentation of the Woodrow Wilson Medal to the Honorable Cordell
Hull (Apr. 5, 1937), in CORDELL HULL & HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG, ECONOMIC
BARRIERS TO PEACE 8, 14 (1937).
204. IRWIN, supra note 33, at 446.
205. Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act: Hearings on H.J. Res. 407 Before the S. Comm.
on Finance, 76th Cong. 16 (1940) (statement of Cordell Hull, Secretary of State).
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had to accommodate security.206 In Ruggie's terms, trade policy had to take
place within a particular (and broad) conception of security.207
In later years, the White House again adopted the instrumentalist
perspective that trade can be seen as fostering security aims rather than
the other way around. At least as early as 2002, the White House National
Security Strategy linked national defense, security, and economic policies.208
President Bush noted that democracy and economic openness were also
"the best foundations for domestic stability and international order."209 This
view served as a driving force for trade lawmaking until recently.2 10 Trade
was considered essential in the maintenance of world peace and to avoid
further emergency.211 Even lawmakers who were not in principle favorably
206. See generally John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379, 393-98 (1982)
(setting out the narrative). My thesis pushes back on Ruggie's by suggesting that what
happened in the twentieth century, by contrast, was at least a partial disembedding of
free trade from its security setting.
207. Id. In contrast, my findings indicate that free trade and the neoliberalism of the postwar
era disembedded trade from security, elevated trade liberalization to an end in and of
itself, and made security an exception to the trade regime. Thus, contrary to the
dominant narrative, there appears to be a broader story to be told about the codified
disembedding of trade policy from broader national social purposes.
208. The Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy identified free and open
markets as critical to national security. See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17-18 (2002),
https://perma.cc/5TDD-LZHP; see also Daniella Markheim & Anthony B. Kim, Free
Trade with the UAE Supports America's National Security Interests, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 4,
2006), https://perma.cc/B295-5CZJ.
209. Sara Fitzgerald & P.O. Driscoll, Trade Promotes Prosperity and Security, HERITAGE FOUND.
(Dec. 18, 2002) (quoting George W. Bush, Introduction to THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 208,
at v), https://perma.cc/H2GV-FRUK (discussing the Bush Administration's economic
security strategies).
210. This idea was at the heart of the Obama Administration's approach to negotiating the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, for example. See Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, TPP Made in America: The Trans-Pacific Partnership 1 (n.d.),
https://perma.cc/DZ9C-9W72; Barack Obama, Opinion, The TPP Would Let America,
Not China, Lead the Way on Global Trade, WASH. POST (May 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/7LF4-
N2DA ("As a Pacific power, the United States has pushed to develop a high-standard
Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade deal that puts American workers first and makes
sure we write the rules of the road for trade in the 21st century."); see also Bown &
Keynes, supra note 10 (discussing with former USTR Froman how the Clinton and
Obama Administrations tried to integrate trade and security, whereas the Trump
Administration makes one conditional on the other). This was likewise the case with
the Bush Administration negotiating trade agreements with countries like Jordan and
Oman. See MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33328, U.S.-OMAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 1-2 (2006), https://perma.cc/498R-JEDP.
211. See IRWIN, supra note 33, at 454 ("The general objectives of [a trade agreement renewed
in 19431 are to substitute economic cooperation for economic warfare in our relations
with other countries . . . and to create the kind of international economic relations
footnote continued on next page
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inclined toward free trade picked up this trope in the interest of "keep[ing] the
peace."212
Innumerable manifestations of the interconnectedness of free trade and
economic security dot the legislative and administrative landscape. They are
captured in now-defunct congressional commissions dedicated to investigating
the growth of trade and "trade aspects of national security."213 Whether security
used trade as a tool or trade served as a source of security, these integrated
approaches formed the foundation for most of U.S. foreign-facing commercial
lawmaking-that is, until they became obscured in recent rhetoric and, more
importantly, in the U.S. Code.2 14 But it was not always that way.
D. The Exceptions' Unexpected Origins and Inverted Purposes
A closer review of the historical record suggests that, surprisingly, what
are now seen as anti-liberalizing exceptions actually began in several instances
as liberalizing exceptions, meaning that they were intended to support the
primary tariff-lowering norm. Although it did not become a popular policy
option in the United States until the late nineteenth century, the idea behind
this approach-that rade restrictions could be used sparingly to open foreign
markets-originated centuries earlier.215 Somewhere along the way to the
present moment, the message appears to have been muddled.
One example of confusion on this score is the background of section 232.
The original delegation to the President hat became section 232 did not permit
the President to raise tariffs; rather, it prohibited him from lowering them
upon which a structure of durable peace can be erected." (quoting Commercial Policy:
The Reciprocal-Trade-Agreements Program in War and Peace, 8 DEP'T STATE BULL. 169, 169
(1943))); LAKE, supra note 33, at 204.
212. IRWIN, supra note 33, at 454 (quoting 89 CONG. REc. 4310 (1943) (statement of Rep.
Rayburn)).
213. For example, in 1966, Congress created the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy
specifically to examine and report on "the subjects of international trade and its
enlargement consistent with a sound domestic economy, our foreign economic policy,
and the trade aspects of our national security." Trade Agreements Extension Act of
1953, ch. 348, §§ 301, 309(a), 67 Stat. 472, 473-74. And even earlier, in December 1943, an
interagency Special Committee on Relaxation of Trade Barriers reported that an
"expansion in the volume of international trade after the war [would] be essential ... to
the success of an international security system to prevent future wars." IRWIN, supra
note 33, at 461; see also Benjamin A. Field & Kian J. Hudson, The Bonds of Peace: A Defense
of the National Security Perspective on Trade, 42 N.C. J. INT'L L. 307, 316-23 (2017)
(reviewing historical examples of "national security perspectives" on trade).
214. See supra Part I.B.
215. See Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking W/TO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 792, 797-99
(2001) (citing ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 295 (Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1776)).
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where "the President finds that such a reduction would threaten domestic
production needed for projected national defense requirements."2 16 That
language was added as an amendment to a two-paragraph act that extended
trade agreement authority to the President for one year.217 One year later,
upon a further extension of that authority, Congress amended the language of
this free-trade focused legislation2 18 to "provide a means for assistance to the
various national defense industries which would have been affected [by other
amendments made by the Act]." 219 The 1955 legislation stated:
[Wihenever the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization has reason to
believe that any article is being imported into the United States in such quantities
as to threaten to impair the national security, he shall so advise the President, and
if the President agrees that there is reason for such belief, the President shall cause
an immediate investigation to be made to determine the facts. If, on the basis of
such investigation, and the report to him of the findings and recommendations
made in connection therewith, the President finds that the article is being
imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten to impair the
national security, he shall take such action as he deems necessary to adjust the
imports of such article to a level that will not threaten to impair the national
security.220
This language was revised in the following three decades to further cabin the
potential and actual applications by future Presidents to be consistent with free
trade norms.221
Consider also the soft security delegations. As early as 1794, Congress
granted the President authority to take different types of action against trading
partners who were unfairly discriminating against U.S. goods with higher
tariffs.222 Various statutes, precursors to what would become exceptions like
216. Act of July 1, 1954, ch. 445, § 2, 68 Stat. 360, 360 (repealed 1962).
217. Id. § 1, 68 Stat. at 360.
218. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, ch. 169, § 7, 69 Stat. 162, 166 (repealed 1962).
219. S. REP. No. 84-232, at 4 (1955) (emphasis added).
220. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 § 7. The Office of Defense Mobilization, an
independent agency in the Executive Office of the President, was primarily responsible
for procurement for military purposes. Exec. Order No. 10,480, 3 C.F.R. 962, 962 (1949-
1953). The Trade Expansion Act "transferred the fact-finding authority to the Office of
Emergency Planning, which was abolished and its functions transferred to the
Department of the Treasury in 1974." Bialos, supra note 94, at 242 n.17. The Commerce
Department picked up the authority as part of a 1979 reorganization. Reorganization
Plan No. 3 of 1979, 3 C.F.R. 513, 515 (1980).
221. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 1993-94 (1975)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2018)); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-794, § 232, 76 Stat. 872, 877 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862); S. REP.
No. 85-1838, at 11 (1958).
222. See K. Blake Thatcher, Comment, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its Utility Against
Alleged Unfair Trade Practices by the Japanese Government, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 492, 495-97
(1987) (outlining the history of like delegations).
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sections 301 and 338, provided that the President could suspend trade benefits
with trading partners whose measures substantially burdened U.S. commerce.
For example, at he time of the Tariff Act of 1890, which put products on a
duty-free list unless the President decided that the exporting country treated
U.S. products unfairly, commentators noted the shift that had occurred to duty-
free as the default with a narrow authorization to the President to depart in
limited circumstances.223
By the start of the twentieth century, Congress had again modified those
authorities to allow the President to respond to other countries' high tariffs
and other practices through tariff micromanagement with the aim of reducing
tariffs imposed by both other countries and the United States to zero.
The Tariff of 1909 allowed the President to decide whether goods from a
particular country would receive the minimum or maximum tariff
arrangement.224 The Tariff was framed like the Tariff Act of 1890 in that the
default position was that lowest tariff rates apply to products coming from a
particular country "[plrovided... [that] the President shall be satisfied ... that
the [relevant] government ... imposes no terms ... which unduly discriminate
against the United States."225 The administration of the tariff rates for each
affected country was left to the President with the idea that the President could
use this tool to effectuate greater tariff reductions instead of having to negotiate
reciprocal deals. In other words, giving the President he ability to implement
the higher rate on a country's product might convince that country not to
discriminate against U.S. goods.226 It was a step toward the entrenchment of a
free trade norm.227
223. F.W. Taussig noted the peculiarity of this structure of the reciprocity provision. See
F.W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: A SERIES OF ESSAYS 251-83
(New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1896).
224. Tariff of 1909, ch. 6, § 2, 36 Stat. 11, 82. The undue discrimination could be "in the way
of tariff rates or provisions, trade or other regulations, charges, exactions, or in any
other manner." Id.
225. Id.
226. The minimum tariff became like a most-favored-nation tariff and the "[miaximum
tariff ... nothing more than a threat used against other countries when these make a
move to apply their own maximum tariffs." F.W. Taussig, The Tariff Debate of 1909 and
the New Tariff Act, 24 Q.J. ECON. 1, 37 (1909). This history also suggests that courts
analyzing the delegations in present challenges may need to look beyond the text to see
this larger context. For example, in a recent case concerning section 232, the Court of
International Trade suggested that using threats of tariff increases as leverage in
unrelated trade negotiations could fall outside the scope of section 232. See Severstal
Exp. GmbH v. United States, No. 18-00057, 2018 WL 1705298, at -'9 (Ct. Int'l Trade Apr. 5,
2018). That may be the case for section 232 with its hard security rationale, but the
record is more mixed than suggested by the court, as outlined above. Undoubtedly, the
legislative record evidences that it is less true in the case of the soft security delegations.
227. Ultimately, economists did not think these new authorities would force tariff rates
down, however. Taussig, supra note 226, at 37-38.
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Thereafter, the U.S. Tariff Commission, created in 1916, in its early years
reviewed the existing trade policies and recommended changes that would lead
to the language of today's soft security exceptions-in the interest of "secur[ing]
the removal of all discriminations which foreign countries may inflict upon
the commerce of the United States."228 The Commission expanded an initiative
to make suggestions to Congress that broader executive engagement was
necessary to address growing unfair trade practices with the intent of forcing
countries to keep their tariff rates down.229 That message was reiterated by
President Warren Harding in his State of the Union Address on December 6,
1921.230 He set out a proposal to give the executive greater tariff authority "to
meet unusual and changing conditions which can not be accurately anticipated."23 1
Harding and the Tariff Commission lobbied successfully. Congress delegated
broad authority to the President along these lines in the Tariff Act of 1922,232
which was later replaced by the Tariff Act of 1930 and embodied in section 338.233
Likewise, what became section 301 was intended to stimulate fairness, to
help "reach and enforce" free trade agreements.234 It was a threat that could be
used with the carrot of an open market to "pry open foreign markets and thus
further liberalize trade."235 Section 301's dual aims can also be seen in the way
its language tracks that of the TPA/fast track delegation. Compare the
condition of the delegation in TPA 2015, which permits the President o pursue
a free trade agreement,236 with that in section 301, which permits the President
228. U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES TARIFF
COMMISSION 5 (1922) [hereinafter U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT]; see also
U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION: ORGANIZATIONS AND
FUNCTIONS 5 (1969).
229. Stephen Meardon, On the Evolution of U.S. Trade Agreements: Evidence from Taussig's
Tariff Commission, 45 J.EcoN.ISSUES 475,479 (2011).
230. 62 CONG. REC. 53 (1921) (State of the Union Address by President Harding).
231. Id. President Harding discussed the need for tariffs to be made "equitable" and to "not
necessarily burden our imports and hinder our trade abroad." Id.
232. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, §§ 316-317, 42 Stat. 858, 943-46 (repealed 1930).
233. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 338, 46 Stat. 590, 704-06 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1338 (2018)).
234. Alan F. Holmer & Judith Hippler Bello, Current Development, The 1988 Trade Bill:
Savior or Scourge of the International Trading System?, 23 INT'L LAW. 523, 527 (1989). There
is some debate about which forces were dominant in leading to the 1974 language.
Compare id. (arguing that section 301's principal objective was to achieve multilateral
trade liberalization), with C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and
the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209,
213-14 (1997) (arguing that section 301 "was designed to allow the President to take
retaliatory action").
235. Holmer & Bello, supra note 234, at 527.
236. 19 U.S.C. § 4202(b) (noting that the President may enter into specified trade agreements
"[wihenever the President determines that ... 1 or more existing duties or any other import
footnote continued on next page
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to apply tariffs.237 On paper, they are very similar in what they require the
President to find as a condition precedent,238 but each grants the President a
different type of discretion: in one case to move tariffs down and in the other
to raise tariffs up, seemingly temporarily, to break down trade barriers.
Throughout the twentieth century, the legislative record clearly demonstrates
that what are today considered soft security exceptions were intended as means
by which to support free trade, even if cautiously. That message has been lost.
Ironically, the opposite is somewhat true as well. The free trade agreement
program began as an "emergency," security-driven program. In March 1934, as
the kernel of the idea of a trade agreement program began to take shape,
President Roosevelt requested from Congress authority to undertake trade
negotiations with other countries.239 The Roosevelt Administration justified
the request for authority, which was unprecedented, "on the grounds that the
foreign trade situation constituted an 'emergency' and that decisive executive
action to promote trade was desperately needed."240 The emergency at that
time was the unprecedented economic depression.24 1 It was not, however, that
the emergency message shifted from security to free trade. As described above,
the two concepts were seen as coincidental and mutually reinforcing.
Roosevelt's principal message throughout the Depression likened economic
crisis to war. In addresses to the public about the economic crisis, Roosevelt
declared that "the Depression was to be 'attacked,' 'fought against,' . . . and
'combatted' by 'great arm[ies] of people.'"242 Others picked this up, blurring the
lines between the executive's military and economic powers.243 Without this
authority, Roosevelt argued, the United States could not "adequately protect its
restriction of any foreign country ... unduly burdens or estricts the foreign trade of
the United States or adversely affects the United States economy").
237. Id. § 2411(b) (permitting the President to apply tariffs "[ilf the Trade Representative
determines ... that ... an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or
discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States commerce").
238. Both 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) and 19 U.S.C. § 4202(b) provide for action if the President or the
USTR finds that a restriction of another country "burdens or restricts" U.S. trade.
239. IRWIN, supra note 33, at 424-25.
240. Id. at 425.
241. 78 CONG. REC. 3580 (1934) (message of President Roosevelt); see also Kenneth W. Dam,
Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, and the W/TO: An Essay on the Concept of
Rights in International Trade, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 709, 711-12 (2005) (discussing the
contribution of the general increase in tariffs to the Great Depression).
242. CASEY ET AL., supra note 77, at 4 (alteration in original) (quoting various statements by
Roosevelt); see also Roosevelt, supra note 81, at 14 (comparing the Depression to "armed
strife").
243. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(describing the "long-continued depression" as "an emergency more serious than war").
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trade against discriminations and against bargains injurious to its interests."244
Emergency economic conditions at that time required greater, not lesser,
liberalization.
Some commentators have regarded the Roosevelt Administration's
advocacy as a critical turning point for the concept of economic security, after
which it became "routine to use emergency economic legislation enacted in
wartime as the basis for extraordinary economic authority in peacetime."245
The intended solution for the crisis was the negotiation of agreements to break
down barriers to trade. The opening words of the RTAA state that it was
enacted "[flor the purpose of expanding foreign markets ... as a means of assisting
in the present emergency in restoring the American standard of living." 246 It
was a limited authority, enabling the President to act for just three years, after
which the authorization would expire.247 Hence, to some degree, the RTAA
was an emergency request that was repeatedly renewed until it became
normalized and free trade became the primary norm.
-Y, -Y, -Y,
The lost history of these exceptions provides a different narrative from
that which dominates the present rhetoric about their use since 2017. While it
appears to many that the United States is using tariffs offensively, having
picked a fight with China,248 these tariff tools were in many ways intended to
be defensive-to fight practices used by other nations against U.S. goods.249
244. U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, supra note 37, at 86.
245. CASEY ET AL., supra note 77, at 4 (citing William E. Scheuerman, The Economic State of
Emergency, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1869, 1878 (2000)). Andrew Preston notes that
Roosevelt changed the language of emergencies by using the term "national security"
instead of self-defense. Preston, supra note 71.
246. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, sec. 1, § 350(a), 48 Stat. 943, 943
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (2018)).
247. Id. § 2(c), 48 Stat. at 944 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1352(c)).
248. See, e.g., Jeremy Diamond, Trump Hits China with Tariffs, Heightening Concerns of Global
Trade War, CNN: POL. (updated Mar. 23, 2018, 6:10 AM ET), https://perma.cc/LAY6-
2YXV; Shannon Togawa Mercer & Matthew Kahn, America Trades Down: The Legal
Consequences of President Trump's Tariffs, LAWFARE (Mar. 13, 2018, 10:41 AM),
https://perma.cc/H4AG-9XDF (quoting the European Trade Commissioner Cecilia
Malmstrom as saying that the tariffs are a "weapon to threaten and intimidate");
Ana Swanson, Trump's Tariffs, Once Seen as Leverage, May Be Here to Stay, N.Y. TIMES
(May 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/Y4UX-8JZQ (citing comments from scholars that the
Administration is working against free trade).
249. As I have asserted elsewhere, a plausible argument can be made that the Trump
Administration is using at least some of the exceptions in this manner-in other words,
with the aim of enhancing liberalization by combatting China's unruly behavior that
harms liberalization goals. Claussen, supra note 125, at 43-44.
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Their original purposes were largely antiprotectionist, whereas, at the present
moment, they are seen as antiliberal and in tension with multilateral rules.250
If the exceptions were supposed to provide the President temporary tools
to convince other trading partners to adopt free trade norms, why were they
not revised to reflect this more clearly? Or, as free trade became the global
norm, why were they not removed? Since 1974, and especially since 1994, the
exceptions collected a considerable amount of legislative dust-which may
mean that just having them available was sufficient deterrence for U.S. trading
partners.25 1 More likely, most trading partners, like most U.S. commentators,
focused attention on the WTO and on free trade agreements.252 While some
exceptions were tweaked in later years, they were overshadowed by free trade
priorities. The liberalization norm became entrenched, and trade agreements
addressing trade-plus issues, like intellectual property, labor, and the environment,
created a diversion for congressional attention.253 Meanwhile, tariff
authorities languished, rarely tested except when private actors tried to take
advantage of them, and even then with few major applications.254
A status quo bias could provide an additional plausible explanation for
why Congress chose not to amend or repeal those delegations for many years,
despite the growth of the free trade norm and the multilateral system.
250. See, e.g., Holmer & Bello, supra note 234, at 527 (referring to the threat of tariffs as a
"stick"). Even though they are seen as antiliberal, they may not be intended as such by
certain members of the Administration. The magnitude and scope of the many tariff
actions, plus President Trump's claim that he is a "Tariff Man," contribute to this
perception. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 4, 2018, 7:03 AM),
https://perma.cc/959A-QK5R ("I am a Tariff Man. When people or countries come in
to raid the great wealth of our Nation, I want them to pay for the privilege of doing so.
It will always be the best way to max out our economic power. We are right now
taking in $billions in Tariffs. MAKE AMERICA RICH AGAIN"). Meanwhile, Trump
Administration officials speak of the tariffs as a way to ensure and promote
liberalization. See, e.g., Robert Lighthizer, Opening Statement of USTR Robert Lighthizer to
the Senate Finance Committee, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (June 18, 2019),
https://perma.cc/FLA8-4UU7 ("We believe our economic relationship with China has
been unbalanced and grossly unfair to American workers, farmers, ranchers, and
businesses for decades."); Swanson, supra note 248 (reporting that the Secretary of the
Treasury Steven Mnuchin said the Administration supports "free and fair reciprocal
trade").
251. See DEESE ET AL., supra note 31, at 62, 72-74 (describing the relevance of trade
agreements made in these two years); WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 112, at 9 (describing
the lack of use of these authorities in recent years).
252. See, e.g., supra note 4.
253. See Claussen, supra note 18, at 328.
254. In some respects, the executive branch expanded its authorities from these exceptional
delegations to make it harder for Congress to effectively oversee its actions. See
Claussen, supra note 38; The United States, Trade Remedies, and the World Trade
Organization, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/LJV8-JV5L
(noting that the U.S. "has not been recently a big user of safeguards").
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Members of Congress may be purposefully risk averse about making changes
to statutory delegations in case those delegations later serve national needs.
They may not have anticipated abuse. Like in other areas of trade
lawmaking,255 an attenuated path dependence appears to explain large parts of
trade law's exceptionalist architecture. Just as in the making of U.S. trade
agreements, paths designed early in the development of modern U.S. trade law
tended to be followed throughout the law's development with an impact on the
resulting institutional structure.256 If anything, the legislative history shows
this neglect may have contributed to misunderstandings about trade law's
meaning and purposes, and ultimately to different types of applications-
applications that, in the last two years, have been perceived not to support a
liberalization norm.
This history also helps correct some confusion about the origins of
exceptionalism. Most important, it demonstrates that the economic security
exceptions were not intended to promote a protectionist norm. Curiously,
recent trade policy choices that appear to prioritize high tariffs have been
facilitated, at least legally, by the neglected exceptionalist structure that was
designed to have the opposite effect.
III. Implications, Alternatives, and Extensions
As suggested in Part II, the current codified dichotomy need not be the
only way to manage the relationship between free trade goals and economic
security concerns. This Part considers other ways forward for trade law and
takeaways for relevant areas of law confronting the same systemic questions.
This Article therefore offers lessons both for trade policymakers and for the
auxiliary literatures from which it draws, particularly for the study of the
nondelegation doctrine and for scholarship on the separation of powers.
A. Lessons for Trade Law and Literature
Seeing trade law as a dichotomy between a free trade norm and economic
security exceptions provides insight for larger debates in the trade law
literature. Some commentators have criticized the recent imposition of the
exceptional security-premised tariffs by the Trump Administration as an
extralegal flexing of U.S. power at the expense of the multilateral trade law
255. See Claussen, supra note 18, at 316-17 (describing path dependence in trade agreements
through "repeated use of standardized text").
256. See, e.g., Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANN. REV.
POL. Scl. 369, 392-93 (1999) (explaining that institutional design, once in place, is self-
reinforcing).
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system.257 In their view, the Administration's actions constitute an illegal or
illegitimate turn away from the free trade rules that have dominated the last
half century of trade lawmaking around the world and a turn toward
protectionism. Those commentators refer to these tariff actions as part of a
larger movement toward geoeconomics, where national economic interests
defeat international commitments in a way that the last half century of
institution building sought to prevent.258 Similar, more generalized rhetoric
suggesting that the United States is in a trade war259 intensifies arguments that
the Trump Administration has made a novel turn toward security and away
from trade rules, using security as a pretext for economic nationalism.260
These arguments, despite their virtue for highlighting important inadequacies
and inconsistencies, miss three key points. First, and most importantly, trade
actions by the United States in the last two years are not lawless. They are not
simply power plays in lieu of using rules. Nor are they a secret back-channel
authority or something invented by the Trump Administration. Rather, these
economic security authorities are prevalent in U.S. trade statutes and have
remained on the books despite the entrenchment of the free trade norm.
However sincere or insincere, the Trump Administration is using rules, just
not the rules thought to be the primary rules.
Second, little about the Administration's policy of using these exceptions is
particularly novel.26 1 They have been deployed before, even if not for several
years.262 For the most part, this application is old wine in recycled bottles.
More important still, the geoeconomic ingredients for such moves have been
in place for some time now. What is different about this moment is that they
257. See, e.g., Schoenbaum & Chow, supra note 4, at 138 & n.149, 174-76; see also Padideh Ala'i,
Essay, The Vital Role of the WTO Appellate Body in the Promotion of Rule of Law and
International Cooperation: A Case Study, 44 YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 86, 88-89 (2019)
(discussing the range of the Trump Administration's actions that threaten the rules-
based system of international trade); Geraldo Vidigal, Westphalia Strikes Back: The 2018
Trade Wars and the Threat to the WTO Regime 1-2 (Amsterdam Law Sch., Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 2018-31, 2018), https://perma.cc/U9JX-T36F (same).
258. See Roberts et al., supra note 4. But see Simon Lester & Inu Manak, Meet the New
Geoeconomics, Same as the Old Geoeconomics (Mar. 20, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that the recent trends are not new).
259. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, Bumbling into a Trade War, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://perma.cc/8Y9W-UL9E.
260. See Kahn, supra note 4.
261. See, e.g., WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 112, at 9; Greg Ip, The Flaw in Trump's National
Security Tariffs Logic, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2018, 11:28 AM ET), https://perma.cc/KY5C-
K9B9.
262. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing section 301's prior uses).
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are being used at a level of magnitude that makes tariff raising appear to be the
default rather than the exception.263
Third, arguments that the Trump Administration is abusing executive
authority in trade264 are made without regard to the exact scope of the
President's trade authority. This analysis provides a window into larger
enduring debates about the relationship between Congress and the executive in
the area of foreign commerce, particularly with respect to tariffs, where
commentators have exhausted less energy. As early as the 1922 delegation that
allowed the President to proclaim certain tariff rate changes, the U.S. Tariff
Commission noted that
[it was realized at the outset that the rule or principle or policy upon which tariff
rates are to be determined is distinctly a legislative problem and that the power to
legislate may not be delegated. The finding of the facts, as well as the application
of the rule or principle to those facts, however, was recognized as essentially an
administrative problem.
26 5
Scholarly attempts to grapple with the separation of powers in trade law
have fallen along several general lines. Some scholars have considered that
there ought to be a "balance" between Congress and the executive in managing
trade policy and have addressed that directly.266 Some have acknowledged that
trade agreements are particularly delicate given the executive's treaty authority,
and that some shared understanding between the branches is necessary.267 Others
263. A further important difference compared to prior use of the exceptions is the backdrop
of functioning multilateral institutions designed to serve as the venue for trade
enforcement.
264. See, e.g., Editorial, Donald Trump's Abusive Trade Powers Need to Be Reined In, FIN. TIMES
(June 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/G9ZK-KMHA.
265. U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 228, at 2. The Commission was
likely trying to square the circle set up by Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649
(1892). There, the Supreme Court upheld the Tariff Act of 1890's provisions
authorizing the President to suspend the duty-free status of specific goods if the
President found that the exporting nation imposed "reciprocally unequal and
unreasonable" import restrictions on U.S. goods. Id. at 692-93. The Court found that the
statute did not "in any real sense, invest the President with the power of legislation." Id.
at 692.
266. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the
Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 239-41 (2009) (advocating for broadly rebalancing
international lawmaking, including trade). Today's emphasis in the media is on
Congress "taking back" its authority. See, e.g., Glenn C. Altschuler, Opinion, How
Congress Can Take Back Control over Tariffs, HILL (June 2, 2019, 12:30 PM EDT),
https://perma.cc/PA2W-MJ43; Henry Olsen, Opinion, The President Has Too Much
Power over Tariffs. Congress Should Reclaim That Authority., WASH. POST (June 14, 2019),
https://perma.cc/3FJ8-DWJ3; Clark Packard, Congress Should Take Back Its Authority
over Tariffs, FOREIGN POL'Y: ELEPHANTS IN THE RooM (May 4, 2019, 4:19 PM),
https://perma.cc/5GBS-Q5K2.
267. Harold Koh outlines five "regimes" of congressional-executive interaction in
international trade relations. Koh, supra note 18, at 1231-33; see also Bruce Ackerman &
footnote continued on next page
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have focused on the substantive output of trade agreements and how to take
into account domestic issues such as the regulatory aspects of the agreements,
their broadening scope, their intersection with other areas of law, or their
potential encroachment on state sovereignty.268 These works help discern the
nature of the trade agreement space, where the emphasis is on lowering
barriers to trade, but ultimately they pay insufficient attention to how to
manage the congressional-executive relationship outside the primary free
trade norm.
In an earlier era, commentators did consider certain tariff-raising statutes
and noted the trade-offs of executive-driven tariff actions and the congressional
commitment to the promotion of an enforceable, rules-based system for
trade.269 Since that time (and prior to the Trump Administration), however,
these potential dangers remained just that-distant possibilities unlikely to
come to pass given the success of the multilateral system. Forgotten but not
abandoned, the exceptions were never examined as a program of their own.
Now maximized, the open-ended delegations have shifted trade authority to
the executive, contributed to the creation of a massive trade administrative
state, and chipped away at the free trade norm by giving the executive license
to act always in the exception, even to negotiate agreements outside
congressional control.270
David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 820-29 (1995)
(describing how Congress and the executive have managed to set up a system for
shared power under fast-track authority); Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, Recent
Development, The Fast Track Debate: A Prescription for Pragmatism, 26 INT'L LAw. 183,
192-93 (1992) (describing how members of Congress decried the discretion granted to
the executive in fast-track authority); Linarelli, supra note 18, at 224 ("Hardly anything
can be found in the documentation relating to the drafting of the Constitution so as to
glean any intent on the separation of powers in the area of foreign commerce.").
Representative Levin also addressed this issue in his consideration of Congress's role in
trade negotiations with Mexico. David S. Cloud, Lawmakers Offer Plans to Modify Fast
Track, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1047, 1047 (1991) (quoting Levin as saying "[there is
something between nitpicking and no role at all for Congress").
268. For important recent contributions in some of these categories, see generally Alexia
Brunet Marks, The Right to Regulate (Cooperatively), 38 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2016)
(addressing the regulatory state and sovereignty); Timothy Meyer, Local Liability in
International Economic Law, 95 N.C. L. REV. 261 (2017) (addressing state and local issues);
and Gregory Shaffer, Alternatives for Regulatory Governance Under TTIP: Building from
the Past, 22 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 403 (2016) (evaluating trade negotiations on regulatory
cooperation).
269. See, e.g., Hudec, supra note 156, at 116; Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliation for Breach
of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J.
301, 310-12 (1990).
270. USTR Lighthizer has indicated an interest in negotiating trade agreements without
congressional approval. Don Lee, Lighthizer Spars with Lawmakers on Trump's Authority
to Enact Trade Agreement with China, L.A. TIMES (Feb.27, 2019, 9:15 AM), https://perma.cc/
B3VC-X7RF (noting that USTR Lighthizer asserted at a congressional hearing that the
footnote continued on next page
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A further lesson for trade law and literature from this analysis is that the
well-established delineation between free trade and protectionism is an
outdated frame.271 This Article tries to set the record straight as to the newly
evolved structure. A more accurate structural model is one that sees the free
trade norm in opposition to exceptional delegations with multiple motivations
and possible outcomes.
B. Revisionist Futures
The mixed history may suggest that the Trump Administration's "three-
digit actions"272 are not necessarily an unprincipled return to protectionism.
But if we accept the predominant view among trade experts that permitting
unfettered use of exceptions is problematic, either because it creates
unpalatable levels of risk or because it confuses congressional intent regarding
the relationship between trade and economic security, we might consider
whether and how to de-exceptionalize.273 Reconciling the opposing strands is
not particularly difficult if the goal is simply to vindicate policy preferences.
One can support or reject economic security exceptions in the service of a
particular outcome (such as combatting unfair trade practices by a trading
partner). But the task is more challenging if the search is for a structure that
can be applied consistently in ways that provide predictable and reliable tools
for legal actors and market participants.
1. Substantive recoupling
In theory, because Congress created this system, Congress hould be able to
take it back. With the creation of the WTO, Congress could have taken the
exceptions off the books to signal its preference for multilateralism. As tools of
an earlier age, the security exceptions served their purpose when needed and
now, in light of the growth of the multilateral system, they should be retired.
Administration would expect to act without congressional approval to enforce the
agreement); see also Claussen, supra note 22.
271. While this characterization is somewhat of an oversimplification, an alternate
dichotomy has governed most of the policy and scholarly debates over the last century.
See, e.g., Koh & Yoo, supra note 18, at 750 (describing the controversy between
protectionism and free trade in the context of congressional and presidential powers
over trade); Note, The Trade Act of 1971: A Fundamental Change in United States Foreign
Trade Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1418, 1419-23 (1971) (describing the same protectionism
versus free trade controversy).
272. Kathleen Claussen, Trade War Battles: Congress Reconsiders Its Role, LAWFARE (Aug. 5,
2018, 11:00 AM), https://perma.cc/76YJ-FYZN.
273. See Shaffer, supra note 4, at 41-42; Kahn, supra note 4.
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As compared to other areas of foreign affairs, Congress is considerably
involved in trade policy and this aspect should theoretically be no different.274
As a practical matter, however, the difficulty of reframing should not be
understated, and not only because any legislative change would require
overriding a likely presidential veto. First is a challenge of terms and concepts.
Since the last major exceptions appeared in statute, the meanings of "trade,"
"economic security," and their underlying statutory manifestations have
changed dramatically. Shifting global circumstances have precipitated a
modified understanding of security, while a major international institutional
system has likewise transformed trade grievances.275 Not only are our present
terms and concepts outmoded, but to reconcile free trade and economic
security seems in some ways to create an impossible bargain: Trade law may
never be able to achieve the "security" outcomes that some policymakers
believe it can. The two ideas appear to demand exclusivity, with each turning
the other into a mere exception controlled by its own logic.276 Trade seeks to
control national security through notions of economic efficiency and
governance; national security seeks to instrumentalize trade to its ends. The
conflict is highlighted in the architecture of U.S. trade law and made more
complicated by the law and politics of both domestic and international trade
policy, leading to more instability and demand for methods of mediation.
Reconciling these concepts could put the liberal trade rule-of-law frame in
jeopardy, especially in controversial circumstances.277
As compared to traditional military defense, maintaining "economic
security" is made more complicated by the fact that so much of its content is
beyond the reach of the state. In a market system, economic security depends
on private actors as well as potentially complex economic forces in a globalized
world.278 Adopting one of the alternative visions noted above, seeing free trade
274. See Claussen, supra note 18, at 318-19; Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost)
Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1263-
65(1988).
275. See, e.g., Ankit Panda, Geoeconomics and Statecraft in the Asia-Pacific: The Diplomat Speaks
to Robert D. Blackwell and Jennifer Harris About Geoeconomics and Statecraft, DIPLOMAT
(May 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/F47M-7B4Y.
276. I thank Harlan Cohen for drawing my attention to this demand.
277. Some have argued it is already in jeopardy, either with respect to the present delegation
situation or to the international space. For an overview, see Kathleen Claussen, Essay,
Old Wine in New Bottles? The Trade Rule of Law, 44 YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 61, 61-62
(2019).
278. As former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter said in a July 2019 interview, "I don't chalk
[the trade war] all up to the Trump Administration, because, I don't think, as I said, that
we have-we've gotten from our economic-international economic policymakers a
full playbook." Carter Interview, supra note 118. Such a playbook "is intrinsically hard
in a country like ours." Id.
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as a tool or source of security, engages a relatively narrow understanding of
both concepts that may not fully account for the influence of today's business
or macroeconomic factors.
An added practical challenge to recoupling is institutional. Different
agencies with their respective equities are involved in this exercise as the trade
administrative state spreads itself across many bureaucratic minisystems.279
Some of that is Congress's doing and was done to discipline its delegations, but
some of that also came from the President when he sought advice on these issue
areas. The result is a complex mosaic that is hard to rewind. Any change to the
system that has developed will necessarily have institutional ramifications.
The politicization of matters related to emergency powers exacerbates this
exercise. An extensive political theory literature has explored opportunities to
balance liberal democratic values with powers that seem inherently illiberal. 280
That dilemma is an old one, and I do not seek to overlay those issues onto trade
law other than as a guide to understanding the risks and rewards.28 1 The
upshot is that ending trade's substantive statutory exceptionalism is
improbable.282 Not only are the exceptions well entrenched, but some also
serve as the basis for major cross-border programs and those, as well as some of
the other soft security exception-premised actions, may be attractive tools that
Congress finds worth keeping.283 Alternatively, Congress could try to provide
greater substantive direction and definition to its delegations to clarify its
279. See Claussen supra note 38.
280. For overviews of these concepts, see generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION
(Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005) (2003); NoMI CLAIRE LAZAR, STATES OF
EMERGENCY IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES (2009); CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY:
FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., MIT Press
1985) (1934 rev. ed.); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A
Typology of Emergency Powers, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 210 (2004) (reviewing models of
emergency power, including as exceptions, and their exercise by liberal constitutional
governments); and Ole Waver, Securitization and Desecuritization, in ON SECURITY 46
(Ronnie D. Lipschutz ed., 1995).
281. Others have applied this thinking to understand recent U.S. policy generally. See, e.g.,
Quinta Jurecic, Donald Trump's State of Exception, LAWFARE (Dec. 14, 2016, 1:01 PM),
https://perma.cc/2MMQ-57S2 (arguing that then-President-elect Trump may be a
Schmittian executive who operates in a state of exception).
282. As Frederick Taussig wrote in 1909, "[an abrupt change of policy is as inexpedient as it
is politically impossible." Taussig, supra note 226, at 8. This remains true despite the
fact that some Republicans sought in 2018 and 2019 to make changes contrary to the
President's wishes. See Adam Behsudi, Grassley Forging Ahead with Bill to Rein in Trump's
Tariff Powers, POLITICO (June 11, 2019, 12:01 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/6UKK-KSVN.
283. As noted, IEEPA is the basis for the U.S. sanctions program. See supra text
accompanying note 90. Additionally, sections 301 and 337 are closely connected with
important intellectual property programs. See MORRISON, supra note 127, at 1-2; About
Section 337, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, https://perma.cc/CCB3-R6PF (archived Apr. 10,
2020).
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intention as to how the exceptions should operate in the service of the primary
norm.284
Even if reform reuniting free trade and security in the substance and spirit
of the law were possible, I remain skeptical about whether trade law, as
presently understood, can adequately accommodate the underlying concerns.
Given the political valence of these issues, there may not be a technocratic
solution. Indeed, neither law nor politics seems particularly well equipped to
manage the trade-security space.
2. Trade's innovative delegation disciplines
To the extent one accepts that substantive trade exceptionalism cannot
easily be corrected, a natural second-best choice might be to try to cabin the
downside risks through procedural checks.285 Additional delegation disciplines
could serve as critical correction devices. This is especially true in an area with
little to no engagement by courts. Where courts are removed from evaluating
executive action, they may at least be able to assess whether appropriate
procedures have been applied.
Congress's delegation of the last word to the President, at least when it
comes to matters of security, which the President can easily claim, means that
Congress must think of other disciplines for managing its tariff program. Part I
addressed the disciplines that appear frequently in U.S. practice. Trade's
delegation disciplines need not be binary. Rather, they can and do take many
forms. Looking historically and holistically, the United States has
experimented with how to manage the trade-related collaboration between the
President and Congress for more than two hundred years.286 Although the four
traditional approaches of consistent congressional engagement, ITC contingency,
agency delegation, and nonintervention have dominated, the potential menu
of options involves all sorts of collaborations and arm's length relationships
that may both enhance and enable productive trade policy.
As a preliminary matter, we might seek to address the disparity in the
breadth and force of congressional supervision over free trade authorities
delegated to the President as compared to the exceptions. In other words,
284. For possible options and other suggestions to revisiting at least section 232, see
Claussen, supra note 272.
285. As Aziz Rana observed regarding national security issues, lawyers tend to focus on
procedural solutions. Rana, supra note 18, at 1420. We might also ask why more
protections were not put on presidential delegations in the first place. See Jide 0.
Nzelibe, The Illusion of the Free-Trade Constitution, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5
(2016) (discussing political divisions as a possible answer); see also Daniel K. Tarullo,
Law and Politics in Twentieth Century Tariff History, 34 UCLA L. REV. 285, 286 (1986)
(same).
286. See Claussen, supra note 38.
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Congress could apply the same congressional oversight as is done for the free
trade norm. A robust consultation and procedurally intricate system for tariffs
like that found in the TPA/fast track context could help to temper exploitative
applications. A TPA for tariff exceptions might include additional time
limitations or a sunset clause and engagement with Congress before, during,
and potentially after the President's decision. This approach also has downsides,
however. TPA risks political paralysis in an area that is already fraught with
political challenges. As I have written in earlier work, TPA can serve as a
straightjacket to trade lawmaking.287 An overly interventionist Congress could
likewise inhibit important tariff measures.
Congress could consider requiring further cross-agency interaction. At
present, multiple agencies manage tariff authorities. Under this arrangement,
these agency may choose to employ their exceptional tools on their own terms
without a view to their cumulative effect. A hybrid discipline that brings
together the USTR, which has an internationally focused mandate, with the
Commerce Department and its domestically focused mandate could create
more synergy and understanding about how each exception works, even if still
imperfect.288
An additional option would be to work within the existing disciplines but
adjust how they operate. For example, Congress could revise the processes for
the investigations undergirding exceptional authorities such as sections 201,
232, 301, or 338 to alleviate their reliance on presidential factfinding. Carrying
out those investigations with congressional engagement, beyond just reporting
requirements, could provide a manageable check on executive action. Congress
could also remove the possibility of political agencies initiating investigations
and instead rely entirely on industry to bring forward cases. Creating a greater
role for the ITC, in particular by taking away final authority from the
President, could help depoliticize outcomes and channel them toward those
supportive of free trade while maintaining flexibility.
But moving within and among existing disciplines is not the only
option.289 Congress could also choose to create additional hybrid options or
287. These are the concerns that drive the OEP theory in favor of executive delegation. See
generally Claussen, supra note 18, at 343-45 (discussing the various ways that congressional
path dependence can prevent innovation in trade policy).
288. A hybrid approach such as this could help or hurt agency competition, which I have
called the east-west divide, pitting the Commerce Department to the east of the White
House against the USTR to the west. See Claussen, supra note 38. The agencies are in
frequent contact, and Department of Commerce staff are often detailed to the USTR.
On other agency competition in the news, see Damian Paletta, Top Trump Trade
Officials Still at Odds After Profane Shouting Match in Beijing, WASH. POST (May 16, 2018,
6:42 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/HG3F-ZGL8.
289. I do not take up here the possible role of international-level disciplines given that the
President can claim exception for his tariff actions in the current international trade
footnote continued on next page
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new disciplines. For one, rather than move the administration of the exceptions
vertically or horizontally, Congress could move diagonally to engage private-
sector actors in decisionmaking. Our trade law apparatus already engages some
private-sector committees in an advisory role.290 That role could be enhanced.
Likewise, an independent committee made up of both agency representatives
and private-sector actors, based on the model of the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States but operating under the auspices of and
reporting to Congress rather than the executive (and with industry input),
could help cabin presidential abuse.29 1
Perhaps most importantly, Congress could also create a larger role for
courts. Indeed, in ordinary domestic law, one might expect courts to sort out
these types of dilemmas. Judicial review provides a smoothing function or
permits commentators to propose corrective lines of doctrine. As Jean
Galbraith notes about foreign affairs generally, however, questions regarding
the separation of powers between Congress and the President have mostly
been determined outside the courts.292 Especially in trade, the legislative and
executive branches and, to some degree, global markets have served as much
more important decisionmakers than judicial bodies. This is not to say courts
have not been involved in trade lawmaking,293 but their authority is severely
curtailed by their limited subject matter jurisdiction and longstanding
doctrines that do not permit them to scrutinize certain executive actions.294
Outside of changes to the U.S. Code and lawmaking levers, greater
convergence of these subject areas and groups would help. We need improved
law regime. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text (discussing the security
exception in the GATT, its history, and possible applications).
290. Examples include the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, the
Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee, the Agricultural Technical Advisory Committees
for Trade, the Industry Trade Advisory Committees, the Intergovernmental Policy
Advisory Committee, the Labor Advisory Committee, the Trade Advisory Committee
on Africa, and the Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee. About Us:
Advisory Committees, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://perma.cc/DA67-HDRW
(archived Apr. 10, 2020).
291. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 1, 4-6 (2020), https://perma.cc/5GEC-4PSC.
292. Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. REV.
987, 990 (2013); see also Koh, supra note 18, at 1208 (calling the Supreme Court
"traditionally a bit player in the intragovernmental struggle over trade management").
293. See supra text accompanying note 28.
294. See generally Patrick C. Reed, Expanding the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of International
Trade: Proposals by the Customs and International Trade Bar Association, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 819 (2001) (discussing the limitations on the CIT's jurisdiction); Devin S. Sikes, Why
Congress Should Expand the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the United States Court of
International Trade, 6 S.C.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 253 (2010) (arguing that the CIT's jurisdiction
is overly limited).
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linkages among the trade bar such as between those attorneys that work on
international trade law with those that do U.S. customs or national security
regulatory work. Collaborations between scholars with different backgrounds
and interdisciplinary conversations could facilitate more creative thinking in
this regard.
The conclusion that disciplinary change to our current trade
policymaking apparatus is needed should not come as a surprise to the average
reader. This is a problem that Congress, industry, and even U.S. trading
partners have come to recognize, albeit belatedly. In the first two years of the
Trump Administration, members of Congress introduced several bills that
seeking to limit the President's authority under section 232 as well as
additional bills that would address his authority under section 201, section 301,
and IEEPA.295 As reflected in the diversity of this legislation, members appear
to be divided on how to address the tariffs or whether to address them at all.
Regardless of which path Congress chooses, if any, the biggest challenge is not
opposition from any particular member, but rather the inevitable veto, raising
the threshold for what will likely be required to get legislation across the finish
line.296
Unfortunately, of the legislative proposals on the table as of May 2020,
most are unlikely to create a major change in trade's security exceptionalism.
Those that are the most likely to get bipartisan traction provide band-aid
solutions such as defining "national security" in greater detail or shifting
authority among politically controlled agencies.297 While those steps may
place some additional constraints on the President, they do not adopt
innovative disciplines that would police abuse in practice. More is needed.
295. See Claussen, supra note 272; Maria Curi, Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Delay Potential Auto
Tariffs, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Mar. 14, 2019, 2:38 PM), https://perma.cc/PW4K-PEQK;
GOP Bill Would Require Congressional Approval ofIEEPA Declarations, INSIDE U.S. TRADE
(June 20, 2019, 10:07 AM), https://perma.cc/7YCQ-HQTH; Isabelle Hoagland, Sens.
Lankford, Coons Divided on USMCA Timing, United on Need for Tariff Legislation, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE (June 13, 2019, 3:26 PM), https://perma.cc/5XXR-V72V; New Kaine-Carper
Bill Would Give Congress Broader Trade Authorities, Influence, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Mar. 27,
2019, 2:36 PM), https://perma.cc/P26P-7XPD; Rep. DelBene Introduces Bill to Prohibit the
Use of IEEPA to Impose Tariffs, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (June 28, 2019, 10:06 AM),
https://perma.cc/RCF6-RPR2; Rep. Murphy Introduces Bill to Give Congress a Say in
National Security Tariffs, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (June 25, 2019, 2:58 PM), https://perma.cc/
Z52X-8FMN.
296. See Behsudi, supra note 282 (discussing the prospect of a strong bipartisan bill given the
possibility that the President may not look favorably on such legislation); Maria Curi,
Toomey: Section 232 Bill Likely to Be Attached to "Must-Pass" Legislation, INSIDE U.S. TRADE
(Mar. 28, 2019, 5:53 PM), https://perma.cc/RAX4-S64X (emphasizing the need for
"veto-proof" legislation).
297. See Claussen, supra note 272. As of May 2020, movement on any of this legislation
remained elusive. See Hannah Monicken, Grassley: Section 232 Reform Efforts Have Stalled,
Could Be Over, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (May 28, 2020,3:06 PM), https://perma.cc/8WXZ-2EAP.
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C. Beyond Trade
Reimagining delegation disciplines for trade's security exceptions
implicates separation-of-powers questions that are hardly new. Outside of
trade, administrative and constitutional law experts have long debated the
congressional-executive relationship with the growth of the administrative
state.298 A burgeoning literature on executive authority that does not need to
be rehearsed here finds benefits in an unbound executive while also warning of
its dangers.299 Oddly, that literature has not explored trade's delegation
problem. Some scholars writing in the 1960s, during the period of major
institutionalization for the exceptions, drew attention to the expanding trade
administrative state on which the exceptions would come to rely.300 In the
1980s, political debates about import regulation prompted further consideration
of the administrative components of tariff law generally.301 But the separation-
of-powers literature is remarkably light on trade's exceptions, how to make
sense of them, how to discipline them, and what they might mean for the
broader administrative law enterprise.
That is not to say that trade law and administrative law have not
influenced each other extensively. When it comes to the nondelegation
doctrine, trade cases loom large. Two tariff-related cases, Marshall Field & Co. v.
Clark302 and JW Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,303 form the foundation of
298. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 168, at 2246-53; Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1994); Peter L. Strauss,
Foreword, Overseer, or "The Decider? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 696, 696-99 (2007).
299. Compare ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 3-5, 13 (2010) (arguing that a stronger executive power would
allow the President to act swiftly and decisively to maximize the public wellbeing),
with DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF
EMERGENCY 2 (2006) (asserting that presidential authority should always be exercised
within the confines of the rule of law to protect against arbitrary presidential action).
300. See George Bronz, The Tariff Commission as a Regulatory Agency, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 463,
463, 466 (1961) (discussing the Tariff Commission's distinct and independent functions
that depart from those of other regulatory agencies due to its limited authority);
Frederick Davis, The Regulation and Control of Foreign Trade, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1428,
1428 (1966) (arguing that the administrative structure of trade regulation is
inconsistent, conflicting, and needlessly complex).
301. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100
HARV. L. REV. 546, 548 (1987); William D. Araiza, Note, Notice-and-Comment Rights for
Administrative Decisions Affecting International Trade: Heightened Need, No Response, 99
YALE L.J. 669, 669-70 (1989); see also Tarullo, supra note 285, at 287.
302. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
303. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
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the nondelegation doctrine.304 Both of these involved precursors to what
would become today's economic security exceptions.305 Since the 1930s, however,
exceptional tariff authorities faded from the doctrinal discussions, unsurprisingly
given their lack of use. There was no major movement in opposition to the
assignment of tariffmaking to nearly unreviewable executive discretion as it
occurred between 1930 and 1974.306
But perhaps most important was the effect of a nontrade constitutional
law case: INS v. Chadha,307 which upended the separation of trade-law powers
overnight. The end of the legislative veto left a gap in the congressional-
executive relationship on trade. By eliminating the legislative veto,308 and
thereby its availability for exceptional presidential tariff authority, the Court
left Congress exposed.309 Chadha stripped the exceptional tariff authorities of
their most important congressional constraints and effectively required
presidential support for new legislation if Congress wanted to reclaim that
control.310 Although Justice White's impassioned dissent in Chadha defending
the legislative veto on functional grounds is not the law,3 11 it may make good
sense for trade, and particularly tariff, authorities that are clearly differently
situated from immigration law, the subject of Chadha. The consequence of the
Supreme Court's foreclosure of the legislative veto without creating a
mechanism for Congress to discipline the open-ended delegations in place
at that time is that our present exceptional tariffmaking process is both
304. Cary Coglianese, Dimensions of Delegation, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1852 & n.11 1856-66
(2019) (citing J.W Hampton, Jr., & Co. as a leading case on the nondelegation doctrine and
referring also to Marshall Field & Co.).
305. Marshall Field & Co. addressed a statute that permitted the President to raise tariffs on
(that is, suspend the free import status of) products from a certain country "for such
time as he shall deem just" when he determined that the other country has imposed
duties on U.S. products that he found "unequal and unreasonable." 143 U.S. at 680
(quoting Tariff Act of 1890 (McKinley Tariff), ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612). J.W
Hampton, Jr., & Co. likewise took up a delegation to the President permitting him to
adjust tariffs when he found that Congress's legislated uty rates did not "equalize ...
differences in costs of production in the United States and the principal competing
country." 276 U.S. at 401 (quoting Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 315(a), 42 Stat. 858, 941
(repealed 1930)).
306. New attempts were made in the mid-1970s, but neither of those nondelegation
challenges was successful. See Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548,
570-71 (1976) (involving a challenge to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962);
United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 580-84 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (upholding the
constitutionality of a presidential proclamation issued under TWEA).
307. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
308. Id. at 959.
309. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
310. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 985-87 (White, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 967-1004.
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"insulated from representative democratic politics and exempted from the
administrative lawmaking procedures and constraints that define most other
forms of economic regulation."312 In the absence of judicial review, the post-
Chadha administrative-law world puts considerable pressure on trade's ex ante
institutional design.313
It would be ironic, but it is not impossible to imagine that the Supreme
Court could take steps now to correct this omission through a nondelegation
challenge to one of trade's security exceptions.3 14 The problem with bringing
such a challenge points back to the core of this Article, however. The now
acutely open-ended trade delegations to the President do not stand alone in
congressional territory where the traditional nondelegation principles might
apply; rather, they invoke security issues from which the Supreme Court is
likely to shy away.315 The trade experience makes clear that the legal
formalism of the nondelegation doctrine is insufficient for managing complex
issue areas such as economic security.
In the meantime, many projects remain. For now, trade's security
exceptions are sited squarely in the hands of the President until there comes a
political moment that can accommodate changing them. In a multidimensional
policy area such as trade, it may be that the traditional boundaries that limit
cooperative models need to be relaxed. Given this landscape, legislators may
wish to turn their attention to the development of alternative delegation
disciplines. And scholars may wish to consider how better to maintain
appropriate flexibility in those disciplines to accommodate a trade rule of law.
Congress, courts, agencies, and the President all regularly engage in trade
lawmaking, but we lack an account of how trade's tasks ought o be allocated
among these actors. This Article begins that effort, but trade's unique position
at the intersections of domestic and international policy, commerce, and
security means that finding the constitutionally and practically appropriate
separation of powers will remain a work in progress.
312. Tarullo, supra note 285, at 287.
313. The trade experience further demonstrates that "the contemporary state of the
nondelegation doctrine represents omething of a Pyrrhic victory for Congress." KEITH
WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 69 (2008). In areas of clear congressional
authority, the doctrine's flexibility toward the executive branch may be more of a curse
than a blessing.
314. See Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1344-45 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2019), aff'd, No. 2019-1727, 2020 WL 967925 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 28, 2020), petition for
cert. filed, No. 19-1177 (U.S. Mar. 27, 2020). A petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari is pending at the time of writing.
315. See Cohen, supra note 21 (elaborating on the conundrum posed by the security
component in the Supreme Court's possible upcoming review of a section 232 case).
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Conclusion
This Article has identified an unseen and misunderstood structure in trade
law with major implications for the separation of powers in the United States
and for the global economy. Exceptional tariff delegations to the President
based on economic security may entail certain benefits-to achieve other
foreign policy objectives, for example, to deflect hot war or to provide leverage
where highly institutionalized processes otherwise do not. They may help
avoid a paralyzed Congress or the risks of path dependence and inflexibility
that congressional decisionmaking on trade ntails. They can create elasticity
in what was once a very rigid and formal tariff-schedule process. But, as a
means to structure and manage U.S. trade law, trade exceptionalism has more
risks than benefits. It permits discretionary tariff actions with vast and
immediate implications for markets, unlike traditional free trade agreements
that not only take an extended period to negotiate, but also are heavily vetted
internally and externally and typically involve just one or a few trading
partners. And yet, despite their salience, any discussion about the influence of
these divergent exceptions and trade's institutional architecture is often absent
from debates about the allocation of powers between the President and
Congress, debates about economic tools and national security, and debates
about the content of trade law.
Exceptional tariff delegations are particularly detrimental without
appropriate delegation disciplines. These two things together-excessive
delegation without procedural checks and the invocation of economic security
in the law-have served as a recipe for trade's executive aggrandizement. As I
will show in a forthcoming companion article, exceptionalism has empowered
Presidents to undertake major trade initiatives outside of congressional
control, such as through the development of what I call "trade executive
agreements."316 Congress ought to undertake the challenging task of seeking to
correct this ambiguous structure and employ alternative mechanisms of
oversight to more effectively deploy its constitutional authority, while still
taking advantage of the executive's comparative advantages of speed, expertise,
and knowledge of security and foreign affairs issues.
In sum, this study shows that statutory framing matters in the separation
of trade law powers. Whereas the concept of trade law at the founding may
have been effectively managed by Congress, issues of economic security that
involve congressional and executive authorities have proven more difficult to
administer. This Article has called for a review of the institutional structure
and norms underlying the relationship between free trade and security.
Questions about who ought to decide these issues are forcing a reconsideration
316. See Claussen, supra note 22.
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of both the principal norm and the exceptions in U.S. political life. Accordingly,
this Article has relevance not just for scholars but also for practitioners. First,
it guides lawmakers as to how they might reshape U.S. trade law. Second, it
provides an agenda for developing supplementary analyses on U.S. trade-law
models.
Ultimately, trade exceptions may be fixtures in U.S. trade law, but they
should be deployed with the recognition that they contribute to the President's
creeping claims to unilateral power in foreign commerce. At the very least,
twenty-first century economic pressures and changing narratives demand a
renewed look at our dichotomous regime.
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